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Abstract 
 
The problem of reconciling the subjectively known mind with the objectively known brain has 
puzzled philosophers and scientists for centuries. When attempting to solve this problem in 
recent times, the focus has been on explaining how the mind is born from the brain, how the two 
are related, and how we can best understand them. This problem is of particular relevance to 
clinical psychology because it attempts to both understand and explain pathological presentations 
by appealing to both subjective personal experience and objective knowledge of the physicality 
of the brain. In this respect, clinical psychology straddles the gap between mind and brain. This 
thesis investigates the implications of the mind/brain problem for theory and practice in clinical 
psychology. Chapter one identifies the tension between knowing the world subjectively and 
knowing the world objectively and discusses the importance of understanding this tension when 
investigating the mind/brain problem. Chapter two sets out the foundational concepts of 
cognitive behavioural approaches in clinical psychology, looking in particular at how cognitive 
behavioural approaches conceptualise mental events like thoughts and beliefs. It is concluded 
that while cognitive behavioural approaches to clinical psychology regularly incorporate both 
mentalistic and physical concepts in its theory and practice, it does not address the inherent 
problems in their combined use, as revealed by the mind brain/problem. In order to improve the 
use of mentalistic concepts within the theory and practice of cognitive behaviourally based 
clinical psychology, chapter three explores the major conceptualisations of mind from the 
discipline of philosophy of mind. To achieve this improvement, chapter four, suggests that 
refining of mentalistic concepts in clinical psychology, through the application of philosophical 
concepts of mind, can be made possible through the use of a framework that captures the 
different explanatory levels at which the mind/brain operates. The levels-of-explanation 
framework is put forward for this purpose. Of particular relevance to clinical psychology is the 
ability to retain the importance of autonomous, subjectively experienced, and causally 
efficacious mental events, while at the same time, being able to give a realistic account of how 
these mental events are linked to the physical brain. The levels-of-explanation framework is 
judged to be a suitable approach with which to achieve this. In chapters five and six, the 
implications of clinical psychology’s use of mentalistic concepts are explored in relation to 
evidence-based practice and case formulation. It is shown that through a greater understanding of 
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both the nature of mind and the relationship between the mind and the brain, improvements can 
be made to both the theory and practice of cognitive behaviourally base clinical practice. This is 
achieved through the application of philosophical concepts of mind, via a levels-of-explanation 
framework, while both researching and undertaking clinical practice in clinical psychology.
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"Does the brain control you or are you controlling the brain? I don't know if I'm in charge of 
mine." 
         Karl Pilkington 
 
One of the problems that confronts the psychotherapist is the basis on which he can justify his 
practice. As a bureaucrat, he will try to support it by results that can be succinctly formulated. 
This is an endeavour that can seem possible for those approaches which depend on technical 
measures with well defined limits and aims (e.g. cognitive therapy). For those of us who are less 
sure of our precise aims, but seek, yet question, the meaning of what might be a richer life for 
our patients, the public justification for what we do is a formidable task... Technique is, in a 
sense, too easy. It tempts us along known paths along which we can travel with confidence but 
turns our eyes away from the surrounding countryside. 
         Lomas, 1999 p. 65 
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Introduction 
 
What is the mind? What is its nature? Where and how does it exist? What effect does it 
have on how we act, how we feel, and who we are? And how is it related to the mass of 
interconnected tissues and fibres that we refer to as the brain? These questions are inherently 
difficult, if not impossible, to answer empirically. They are difficult to answer because we are 
all, to an extent, prisoners in our own subjective world. One cannot know directly what another 
experiences. Despite this predicament, clinical psychology is concerned with understanding and 
improving people’s subjective experience. As highlighted in the quote by Peter Lomas above, the 
ultimate goal of clinical psychology is an improved quality of life for our clients, which in the 
final analysis, is experienced subjectively. 
 Lomas (1999) refers to the meaning of a richer life for our clients in order to highlight the 
importance in clinical psychology of clients’ subjective experience, and also to raise the point 
that an overemphasis on technique leads to the adoption of tacit, and therefore untested, 
assumptions about the nature of mind. In this thesis, it is argued that in relation to the nature of 
mind, cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology does indeed travel a known path with 
confidence, but without seeing the countryside.  Further, it is argued that the means are available 
with which to ‘turn our heads’ and see the ‘countryside’ of the mind. Stated plainly, while 
cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology includes in its theories and practice a 
particular conceptualisation of what the mind is, it does not attempt to systematically develop 
and refine this conceptualisation of the mind. However, philosophy of mind does. Within the 
philosophy of mind, there are varying theories of mind which have been articulated and debated 
and refined in order to improve the understanding of mind, and how it fits ontologically within 
the natural world. These philosophical theories can be applied to inform and improve the 
untested conceptualisation of mind in clinical psychology, and as a result, improve both its 
theory and practice. To suggest that philosophy of mind be employed to improve our 
understanding of concepts of mind in clinical psychology is somewhat counter intuitive, because 
it requires the application of less empirical types of knowledge (e.g., metaphysics) to the science 
of clinical psychology in order to improve this understanding. It is important to do this for the 
two reasons discussed above. Firstly, because the subjective experience that constitutes mind is 
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of central importance to clinical psychology through the importance of mentalistic concepts like 
thoughts and beliefs. Secondly, because, despite the frequent use of mentalistic concepts that 
constitute the mind, the nature of such concepts is not well understood in clinical psychology due 
in good part to a heavy focus on technique.  
 In order to make suggestions as to how the understanding of mind can be improved in 
cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology, certain important issues must be considered. 
The difficulty with knowing the mind, in other words the mind/brain problem, must be explored 
so that the problem is made clear enough that plausible solutions can be suggested. This needs to 
done with regard to how we as humans attain knowledge. Indeed the mind/brain problem is 
similar to, and must take into account, the tension between objectively knowing ‘things’ and 
subjectively knowing ‘things’; a tension that is at the foundation of scientific inquiry. Knowing 
the mind has a further unique problem to overcome: While one can know all other ‘things’ as 
separate from oneself, and therefore can appreciate their objectivity, this cannot be done with the 
mind. These particular restrictions on knowing the mind must be taken into account when 
investigating the nature of mental events in clinical psychology. 
The history and development of cognitive behavioural therapy, must also be explored to 
uncover what tacit assumptions are made about the nature of mind. Cognitive behavioural 
therapy makes particular assumptions about the nature of mind. Particularly, these are that 
thoughts and beliefs (mental events) exist in their own right, that they can be identified and 
monitored, and that they can be challenged and changed. Our knowledge of the nature of mental 
events in cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology is assumed, but not well established. 
Moreover, while particular attention is paid to the effects of causally efficacious mental events, 
their nature and the way in which they are able to be causally efficacious, is not often considered.   
In contrast to clinical psychology, the nature of mind is central to the philosophy of mind. 
Within the philosophy of mind, different theoretical positions are promulgated as to the nature of 
mind, some of which are consistent with clinical psychology and some of which are contrary. 
The process of theory development and refinement requires the consideration of contrasting and 
opposing positions in order to establish knowledge that is as close to the truth as possible. At the 
present time, cognitive conceptualisations of mind in clinical psychology are largely 
uncontested. 
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 However, it is not enough to simply point out the weaknesses that exist in the way 
clinical psychology understands the mind. Suggestions must be made as to how this 
understanding may be improved. Further, the ability to retain the importance of subjective 
experience in the explanation of mood and behaviour, while at the same time adhering to a 
naturalistic world view, is required; in other words, an explanation of how the mind is produced 
by the physical brain. The best way to do this is by conceptualising the mind/brain as consisting 
of different explanatory levels which extend from its micro physicality, up to subjectively 
experienced, conscious, mental life. With a levels-of-explanation approach, it is possible both to 
include a variety of different types of knowledge of the mind/brain, thus retaining the importance 
of mentalistic and physical explanations of mind, and to explore the interrelationships between 
these different types of knowledge, thus providing a more comprehensive understanding of the 
mind. Of particular importance to cognitively based clinical psychology is whether the nature of 
mental events allows them to be causally efficacious in their relationship with behaviour and 
emotion. When conceptualising the mind as consisting of different explanatory levels, it is 
possible to hypothesise how subjectively experienced mental events can be causally efficacious 
because of their inherent properties.  
 If it were possible to develop a conceptualisation of mind that retains the importance of 
subjective experience and if we can establish the causal nature of mental events, while also being 
able explain how mental events are born from but not reducible to their physical substrates, then 
clinical psychology would be improved – in particular, evidence-based practice and case 
formulation. It is assumed that if a more comprehensive understanding of the mind and its 
relationship to behaviour and emotion can be established, then the validity of cognitive 
behaviourally based theories in clinical psychology will be improved. Furthermore, a more 
comprehensive understanding of the mind would improve the practice of clinical psychologists 
through possible improvements to the case formulation process. Because case formulation in 
cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology is concerned with the explanation of an 
individual’s problems by appeal to latent cognitive causal mechanisms, improving our 
understanding of these mechanisms and their possible strengths and limitations in the prediction 
of behaviour, will improve the reliability of case formulation and possibly increase the 
effectiveness of treatment. 
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 The inclusion of subjectively experienced mental events in the theory and practice of 
clinical psychology is a necessity. However, there are certain limitations to knowing subjectively 
experienced mental events, which serves to reduce their utility in explaining behaviour and 
emotion. At present, clinical psychology, unlike philosophy of mind, arguably has little 
appreciation of either the nature of such mental events or the limits of their use in the explanation 
of behaviour and mood.  However, the means are currently available to combine a 
comprehensive understanding of mind with theory and practice in clinical psychology. This 
would improve the way that cognitively based clinical psychology conceptualises the mind and 
how these concepts are used in clinical practice. 
9 
 
Chapter One 
 
Epistemological considerations: The world knot and crossing the subjective-objective divide 
 
Objective versus subjective knowledge of the world 
Simply put, the attempt to gain knowledge of and make sense of the world has been 
hindered by the division between knowing things subjectively and knowing things objectively. 
This tension is inherent in the debate on the nature of mind, and permeates issues at the 
foundations of scientific knowledge. Prominent among these are the contrasts between a 
posterior versus a priori, and empiricist versus theoretical approaches to gaining knowledge 
about the natural world (Kukla, 1989). In a broad sense, a posteriori and empiricist approaches 
value direct observation and inductive reasoning in order to gain knowledge of the world, 
whereas a priori and theoretical processes value theorising and explanatory, or abductive, 
reasoning.  
George Orwell, in his dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty Four (Orwell, 1954), successfully 
highlights the epistemological tension between knowing the world objectively versus knowing 
the world subjectively. Set in a future where technology has vastly increased the means for 
totalitarian control of the populace, the last refuge is the mind, and Big Brother is quickly 
establishing control of this final frontier. With such control, Big Brother is able to create 
‘objective’ reality by controlling subjective thoughts: “Who controls the present controls the 
past, who controls the past controls the future” (p.199), in other words if the party says it’s so 
(real) then it is so (real). The main character of the novel, Winston Smith, has trouble reconciling 
what he suspects to be the truth with what the party says to be the truth. In short he commits 
‘thought-crimes’. Winston is eventually caught and the book culminates in a passage in which he 
is tortured into accepting the argument for a subject reality. His torturer, the enigmatic O’Brian 
preaches: “Only the disciplined mind can see reality, Winston. You believe that reality is 
something objective, external existing in its own right. You also believe that the nature of reality 
is self evident. When you delude yourself into thinking that you see something, you assume that 
everyone else thinks the same thing as you. But I tell you Winston, that reality is not external. 
Reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else.” O’Brian, who argues for a subjective 
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reality asks: “How many fingers am I holding up Winston?”, “Four”, “And if the party says that 
it is not four but five, then how many”…“Four”. The torture ensues and Winston replies: “Four. I 
suppose there are four. I would see five if I could. I am trying to see five”. Eventually, Winston 
starts to succumb: “And he did see them for a fleeting instant… there had been a moment, he did 
not know how long, thirty seconds perhaps – of luminous certainty, when each new suggestion 
of O’Brian’s had filled up a patch of emptiness and become absolute truth, and when two and 
two could have been three as easily as five, if that were what was needed”. 
Winston’s struggle highlights a central dilemma in philosophy of science. Winston 
believed there was an external reality; of course he did, after all it does seem self-evident. 
However his feelings of unease in accepting a completely subjective reality gradually recede: 
“The fallacy was obvious. It presupposed that somewhere or other, outside ones self there was a 
‘real’ world where ‘real’ things happened. But how could there be such a world? What 
knowledge have we of anything save through our own minds? All happenings are in the mind” 
(p. 192-207).  
The main issue raised in this excerpt centres on the fact that consciousness is self 
contained and is private. One will always be a subject to oneself and an object to others 
(Humphrey, 1992). Thus, as Winston points out, any knowledge we have of anything is through 
our own minds, and therefore subjectively experienced. Winston’s confusion is understandable, 
for the same problem has been pondered constantly by philosophers throughout the centuries.  
Born from the different scientific approaches of Aristotle and Plato, the debate over 
whether it is better to rely on our observations or on our thoughts in our attempts to understand 
the natural world has been argued vigorously. Throughout the history of science, each position 
has enjoyed popularity at certain times. John Locke began the British empiricist tradition which 
included Hume and Berkeley. Emanuel Kant, on the other hand, stressed the importance of 
theoretically established knowledge, which is often referred to as the rationalist position in 
philosophy. Recent scientific history, which includes the rise of psychology as a discipline, has 
been dominated by empiricism. At the turn of the 20th century, several difficulties inherent 
within the empiricist position were addressed by the application of formal logic, a position 
referred to as logical positivism (Kukla, 1989). The dominance of empiricism lasted for most of 
the 20th century and was especially prevalent within psychology, so much so that theoretical 
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pursuits in psychology were seen in a derogatory light. However, the importance of theoretical 
research is now being increasingly acknowledged within psychology (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007). 
Although it can be argued that there is a need for both types of inquiry to be equally developed, 
the legacy of strict empiricism is still prevalent in psychology. 
Strict empiricism denies that knowledge can be gained from means other than the senses 
or direct measurement. Theoretical, or a priori investigation, on the other hand holds that there 
are phenomena that exist objectively, which we cannot know directly through the senses 
(subjective awareness), but whose characteristics we can gain knowledge of through making 
(albeit indirect), logical and scientifically sound inferences. Both approaches have their 
epistemological strengths and weaknesses, and value different methods and approaches to 
establishing knowledge claims. However, they can be complementary when used in tandem for 
the development of knowledge within a scientific discipline. However, as just stated, this has not 
always been the case, especially not in psychology (Kukla, 1989).  
Should empirical or theoretical methods be dominant in science? Should Aristotle’s 
reliance on the senses or Plato’s insistence on the use of thought, be adopted as the preferred 
mode of inquiry? Ideally, neither approach should be dominant; rather, each should work to its 
strengths. This has not been the case in psychology, with empirical investigation dominating at 
the expense of theory construction (Kukla, 1989). The dominance of empirical investigation is 
seen throughout the sub-disciplines of psychology including clinical psychology. The emphasis 
has been largely based on experimental designs, in an all-too-often inductive approach to 
research.  
The empirical dominance in clinical psychology is exemplified in the development of 
cognitive behavioural therapy. Noticing that the thoughts a person espoused seemed to have an 
effect on their mood, Aaron Beck developed cognitive behavioural therapy (Dobson, 1988). In 
this way, cognitive behavioural theory was developed from observation and clinician intuition 
rather than from theory, which raises certain epistemological issues (Westen & Bradley, 2005) 
that will be further explored in chapter two. Cognitive behavioural therapy has as a foundational 
premise that thoughts have a causal relationship with emotions and behaviour. Since its initial 
development, it could be argued that most of the time and resources have been devoted to the 
empirical investigation of the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapy as a treatment for various 
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psychopathologies, as opposed to refinement of theory. The dominance of empirical 
investigation in psychology has both restricted the development of sophisticated theory (Kukla, 
1989), and at the same time discouraged metaphysical debate in clinical psychology. While 
psychology is dominated by empiricism, the philosophy of the mind is in good part a 
metaphysical pursuit (in the broad sense of term), with the majority of the work being theoretical 
in nature. Clinical psychology, and psychology in general, cannot afford to distance themselves 
from, or ignore, the main metaphysical themes on the nature of mind because many of the 
mentalistic concepts central to the cognitive behavioural conceptualisation of mental disorders fit 
more naturally within the philosophy of mind than the science of the brain. 
The distinction between objective and subjective knowledge is of central importance to 
human understanding. It arises in various forms, not only in how we understand the natural 
world, but also in our explanations of the minds and behaviours of others. This distinction is of 
central importance to cognitive behavioural theories in clinical psychology because they attempt 
to assign causal efficacy to subjectively experienced mental events in order to explain 
pathological presentations. But, in what way can we understand someone else’s personal mental 
experiences? Can we have knowledge of causal mental mechanisms that cannot be directly 
measured in an empirical sense? Does an external reality exist? Is it the same for everyone? 
These questions highlight the unique problem with understanding the mind, when using the mind 
to do the understanding. 
The World Knot  
The tension between objective and subjective approaches to understanding of the mind 
gives rise to several issues. Namely, in what way are we to gain knowledge of, or understand, 
mental events? Do we achieve this subjectively, only trusting an understanding of mental events 
through experiencing them, for example, in the way that I experience thoughts, therefore take 
those thoughts to be real? Or can we establish a comprehensive, objective understanding of mind 
as it relates to all of humankind, classified within a taxonomy? The problem is that we are trying 
to use subjective awareness, or the mind, to attempt an objective understanding of the mind. This 
problem is commonly known as the World Knot (Edelman & Tononi, 2000): Given that all 
human experience is subjective, are we able to know that very subjectivity in an objective 
manner?  Cognitive behavioural approaches in clinical psychology presume that we can do this, 
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without an appreciation of the precarious epistemological position this presumption creates. 
Personal mental events such as thoughts and beliefs are experienced subjectively, and cannot be 
experienced by anyone but their owner, and therefore cannot be measured directly. Therefore, 
cognitive behaviour theory makes implicit assumptions about the link between the subjective 
mind and the objective brain, but it does not address how this is accomplished. The solution to 
the problem of the world knot has been attempted by many and arguably has not been achieved.    
Ultimately, the problem with the objective/subjective division of knowledge as it applies 
to the understanding of mind is this: we cannot debate the claim that mental phenomena exist; 
that we all have conscious experience is proof enough. However, how close to the truth is our 
current understanding of mental events?  Our current understanding of the causes and nature of 
consciousness and mental events may be as far from the truth as Descartes’ pineal gland link 
between body and soul. Indeed, serious doubts have been raised about the way that clinical 
psychology conceptualises the mind (Vanderwolf, 1998). Valid criticisms of concepts of mental 
events, such as those found in strong reductionist theories of mind, are not given sufficient 
attention in clinical psychology. However, while the particular difficulties and peculiarities of 
investigating the mind need to be understood, their presence do not provide good reasons to 
abandon the attempt (Edelman & Tononi, 2000). In actuality, they highlight the need to utilise 
different approaches in an attempt to understand the mind, both empirical and theoretical, both 
objective and subjective, and both direct measurement and inference. 
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Chapter Two 
The History and development of cognitive behavioural therapy 
The history and development of cognitive behavioural therapy 
In New Zealand the predominant training model for clinical psychologists is one of: 1) 
general training across many areas of clinical practice; 2) the adoption of the scientist-
practitioner model of practice; and, 3) basic training in cognitive behaviour therapy. Despite the 
increasing popularity of third wave therapies such as mindfulness, dialectical behavioural 
therapy, and schema based therapy, the scientist-practitioner model stresses the importance of 
using thoroughly researched and validated techniques. This means that cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT), which has by far the most extensive empirical evidence of efficacy (McGinn, 
2000; Roth & Fonagy, 2005), is the default treatment approach within clinical practice in New 
Zealand. 
An attempt to assess the tacit philosophical assumptions made in the practice of cognitive 
behaviourally based clinical psychology must necessarily examine the development of CBT and 
its main tenets. The evolution of CBT occurred roughly in three stages: 1) the emergence of 
behavioural therapy in the 1950s; 2) the emergence of cognitive psychology from the 1960’s 
onwards; and, 3) the joining together of cognitive with behavioural therapies to form CBT (Clark 
& Fairburn, 1997). The merging of somewhat disparate schools of thought has provided CBT 
with an interesting, and at times, contradictory set of foundational principles.  
An important clarification to make when examining the history and development of CBT 
is the use of the term ‘behavioural’, for its use in CBT is not the same as its use in behaviourism. 
The main difference between CBT and behaviour therapy is that CBT assumes behaviour is 
mediated by both emotion and thought in the development and maintenance of psychopathology. 
Behaviourism (in its radical behaviourist form) on the other hand conceptualises abnormal 
behaviour and psychopathology in behavioural terms only. Likewise, the cognitive component in 
CBT can be considered as born from, but slightly removed from, the discipline of cognitive 
psychology. In both cases, CBT in a loose sense, applies the principles of the two disciplines of 
psychology, but are not strictly governed by the theoretical developments within those 
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disciplines. Despite CBT not being equivalent to the separate cognitive and behavioural 
psychologies, an understanding of both is essential to understanding the underlying philosophical 
assumptions made in CBT. 
Behaviourism, the dominant school of psychology during the middle of the 20th century, 
was applied to the treatment of psychopathology during the 1950’s. The adaptation of 
behaviourist principles to therapy was in part a reaction to the dominance of Freudian 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy at the time. In this respect, behaviourism added an empiricist 
ethos to clinical psychology which it had lacked (E. Miller, 1999). Indeed, behaviourism 
provided clinical psychology with its own scientifically based clinical practices, where it had 
previously borrowed from psychiatry and social work (R. Miller, 1992). Behaviourism is 
principally based on a refined version of Thorndike’s law of effect. B. F. Skinner refined the law 
of effect, viewing behaviour as the product of classical and operant conditioning whereby an 
organism interacts with its ecological and social environment. Although most behaviourist 
research was done on animals in controlled experiments, the assumed similarities between 
animal and human behaviour led to its adaptation to human populations. The most famous early 
example of behavioural techniques being applied clinically was when a young boy named Albert 
was conditioned to fear a previously neutral stimulus (white fluffy rabbit). Joseph Wolpe was the 
first to demonstrate that such conditioned neuroses could be reversed using reciprocal inhibition 
as used in a systematic desensitisation technique. Wolpe’s work was important becasue it had a 
theoretical basis from which testable hypotheses could be derived (Barlow & Durand, 2005). 
Similarly, one of the first attempts at developing a behavioural account of the development and 
maintenance of psychopathology was Mowerer’s two factor theory. Mowerer described the 
development of anxiety as occurring initially by the process of classical conditioning which is 
then maintained by operant conditioning, through negative reinforcement (Cox & Taylor, 1999).  
With the application of the principles of behaviourism to areas of clinical psychology, 
both with therapeutic methods and theories of psychopathology, the underlying foundational 
assumptions of behaviourism were also adopted, albeit in a diluted manner. Behaviourism has a 
firmly empirical basis, in that it is committed to an objective, scientific account of psychological 
phenomena based on facts. This is in contrast with behaviourism’s main therapeutic rival at the 
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time, psychoanalysis. The theories postulated by Freudian Psychoanalysis have been  largely un-
testable, and the position quickly became unpopular in psychology (Grunbaum, 1991).  
While it is true in a general sense that behaviourism adheres to certain foundational 
principles, differences exist in the extent to which behaviourists adhere to a positivist doctrine, 
both within clinical psychology and psychology in general. At the extreme end, radical 
behaviourists adhere to a positivist epistemological position that the only valid knowledge is 
derived from observation and experience as opposed to theorising about the nature of latent 
causal constructs (Clark & Fairburn, 1997). This position was prominent in the United States of 
America due to the influence of Skinner and other radical behaviourists. However, other more 
moderate behaviourist positions did exist. In the United Kingdom, for example, the development 
of behaviour therapy took a slightly different route. Here the early application of behaviour 
therapy was mainly on non severely affected, outpatient samples as opposed to the United States 
of America where behaviour therapy was mostly used on inpatients with more severe mental 
illness (Clark & Fairburn, 1997). As a result, behaviour therapy in the United Kingdom tended to 
be more moderate in its positivist position. It is important to understand that there are various 
behaviourist positions when considering the development of CBT because behaviourism is often 
labelled as ‘positivistic’ within clinical psychology as an intended insult (E. Miller, 1999). That 
radical behaviourism adheres to an arguably untenable positivist stance does not mean that the 
behavioural component within the practice of clinical psychology is characterised by a strongly 
positivist epistemology. 
CBT is incompatible with the positivistic claims of the radical behaviourists, despite CBT 
retaining certain weakened foundation principles of behaviourism. The most substantial 
implication of the radical behaviourist position for CBT is that a persons ‘thoughts’ would be 
considered epiphenomenal, and therefore, unimportant and inconsequential to behaviour. From a 
radical behaviourist perspective thoughts cannot be directly observed or measured in an 
empirical sense and therefore are not an important avenue for investigation (Roth & Fonagy, 
2005). Therefore, a causal relationship between thoughts or mental events and behaviour and 
emotion cannot be established. This is contrary to the main tenet of CBT: that maladaptive 
thoughts can lead to the development of psychopathology which include specific emotional and 
behavioural patterns. Thus, CBT has retained certain behaviourist principles, not least, the 
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insistence on the empirical validation of knowledge claims, but in a less stringent form. Whether 
this was deliberate, or a natural consequence of the introduction of the cognitive component to 
CBT, is unclear. The main legacy of behaviourism’s contribution to CBT is that it provided 
clinical psychology with scientific credibility and a thorough empirical basis (Clark & Fairburn, 
1997; E. Miller, 1999).   
The limitations of behaviour therapy become obvious toward the later half of the 20th 
century. Work by Bandura (Bandura, 1986) on modelling and vicarious learning convinced many 
psychologists that behaviourism was not expansive enough to account for all human behaviour 
(Dobson, 1988). Although behaviour therapy was suited to treatment of phobia and anxiety, little 
progress was made in the treatment of other forms of psychopathology such as depression. Also, 
behaviour therapy drifted from its behavioural roots and as a result its theoretical foundation was 
less debated, and its research focussed more on technique. This signalled a move towards therapy 
as a technology rather than as a science (Clark & Fairburn, 1997).  
The shortcomings of behavioural and psychoanalytic approaches to therapy encouraged 
alternatives with the rise of cognitive psychology providing a plausible alternative (Clark & 
Fairburn, 1997). The increasing popularity of cognitive psychology saw information processing 
models applied to clinical constructs (Dobson, 1988). Researchers like Aaron Beck (1967) 
pioneered a cognitive conceptualisation of psychopathology, for it had become obvious to many 
that the way a person thought about and perceived themselves, their environment and their 
position within it, had an effect on their subsequent behaviour and mood (Dobson, 1988).  
The work of Aaron Beck (1967) , who adopted a more scientifically rigorous approach to 
research, was based on how depression is caused and maintained by faulty information 
processing and reasoning as well as the development of depressogenic schemas (Clark & 
Fairburn, 1997). Beck theorised that depressed people make false assumptions in three main 
areas, which he called the ‘cognitive triad’. The cognitive triad includes faulty assumptions about 
the self, the world, and the future. Ideas about the relevance of cognition to psychopathology 
developed at about the same time that the discipline of cognitive psychology became popular 
within psychology, but the two should not be considered the same. While maintaining the same 
outlook, they differed in theory, terminology, and method. Cognitive therapy deals mainly with 
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correcting irrational thoughts whereas cognitive psychology deals mainly with information 
processing in general (Clark & Fairburn, 1997; McGinn, 2000; Roth & Fonagy, 2005).  
With the limits of behaviour therapy and the rise of cognitive psychology, together 
providing the impetus for change, the two approaches were combined, with the cognitive 
approach providing relevant thought content to behaviour therapy (Clark & Fairburn, 1997). 
Clark & Fairburn (1997) regard this combination of the two approaches to therapy as 
confirmation of the connection of phenomenological psychopathology and behavioural therapy. 
To illustrate this view, consider obsessive compulsive disorder. Behaviour therapy acknowledges 
the presence of intrusive unwanted thoughts, but considers the content almost irrelevant. 
However, for the cognitive therapist the content of the intrusive thought is of the utmost 
importance. As a result, the cognitive approach allows for a greater understanding of the possible 
mechanisms that produce psychopathology. Therefore, CBT is not simply an amalgamation of 
behavioural and cognitive psychology. Although it draws on these two psychological traditions, 
it adopts its own particular approach to the research and treatment of psychopathology. Because 
of this a closer look at the basic premises upon which CBT rests is necessary. 
Cognition Defined 
At this point the term ‘cognition’ needs clarification. ‘Cognition’ is used in a number of 
different contexts. Generically, the term is used to describe any class of mental event where the 
underlying characteristics are of an abstract nature and involve symbolising, insight, complex 
rule use, imagery, belief, intentionality, problem solving, and so forth. For the purpose of the 
discussing ‘cognition’ from a philosophical viewpoint, the distinction between ‘cognition’ as it is 
used in clinical and cognitive psychology is important in order to avoid confusion. The use of the 
term ‘cognition’ as studied by cognitive psychologists tends to deal with automatic mental 
processes examined experimentally, and can be distinguished from those ‘cognitions’ 
synonymous with ‘belief’, ‘thought’ or ‘propositional attitude’. The latter are employed within 
the domain of social/personality psychology, draw on principles from commonsense/folk 
psychology, and are harder to measure or know in an empirical way. For example, taking longer 
to declare the print colour of an incongruent colour word (the word red printed in blue) than 
declaring the colour of a coloured square, lets us make inferences about cognition that are quite 
different from the assumption that when depressed, one will make false attributions based around 
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ideas of the self, the world, and the future. Cognitions, as constructs referred to in CBT, are 
essentially of the latter type, but the evidence for these constructs is often given via cognitions of 
the former type. The debate around what cognitions or mental events are, remains one of the 
central debates in the philosophy of psychology – one which we will soon turn to. The main 
conceptual issues surrounding the nature and causal properties of cognitions as envisaged by 
CBT, are essentially the same as those of the philosophical mind-brain debate about the nature of 
mind  
Cognitive behavioural therapy: The conceptualisation of mental events 
The term ‘CBT’ covers a number of therapies that have a similar basic theoretical 
assumption: that which we know of as thinking or cognition occurs, and this thinking or 
cognition can cause changes in emotions and behaviour. CBT is based on three main premises: 
the first states that cognitive activity/mental events affect behaviour and that the cognitive 
appraisals one makes of an event can affect ones reaction to that event; secondly, that cognitive 
activity can be appraised, monitored, and changed (although access to cognitions is not perfect); 
and thirdly, that behaviour can be altered as the result of altering cognitive content (A. Beck, 
1967; J. Beck, 1995; Dobson, 1988; McGinn, 2000; Scher, Segal, & Ingram, 2004).  
According to cognitive behaviourally based therapy, distorted or maladaptive thought 
patterns contribute to and cause particular psychopathology. It is also held that these thoughts 
vary in kind from those that are fleeting and easily changed, to those that are deeply entrenched 
and deeply resistant to change. Although certain ‘depressogenic’ thoughts can be relatively 
common, a more pervasive pattern often leads to major pathology.  Beck’s (1967) model is a 
three-tiered model covering levels of imbedded cognitive functioning with the more ingrained 
levels influencing those of a more automatic nature. Beck outlined three broad types of beliefs or 
thoughts, each playing a different but related role in the development of psychopathology: 
automatic, intermediate, and core beliefs (J. Beck, 1995). 
Automatic thoughts are those thoughts that we are not necessarily consciously aware of – 
the rapid ideas that come quickly to mind without conscious awareness of the processes by 
which they occur. The normal process of making sense of events or interpreting the environment, 
by way of automatic thoughts, is considered to be dysfunctional in those who experience 
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psychopathology (J. Beck, 1995). In contrast to automatic thoughts, which tend to be closer to 
conscious awareness and easily accessible, there are deeper, more ingrained beliefs about the self 
and the world. These more ingrained beliefs fall into two broad categories: core beliefs and 
intermediate beliefs.  
Intermediate beliefs sit between the more transient negative automatic beliefs and the 
more ingrained and stable core beliefs. Intermediate beliefs often come in the form of underlying 
assumptions, rules, and attitudes that serve to modify the effect of core beliefs upon automatic 
thoughts. For example ‘if I don’t do the job perfectly then it’s a failure’ is an example of a 
negative automatic thought; this attitude may influence the formation of rules like ‘I must do all 
things perfectly’, and the assumption that ‘I may become a good and worthwhile person if I do 
everything perfectly’. These types of rules and assumptions, or intermediate beliefs, often give 
negative automatic thoughts their flavour (J. Beck, 1995). 
Both automatic and intermediate thoughts have their foundation in core beliefs. Core 
beliefs are central ideas about the self  and are thought to cluster in schemas (cognitive structures 
of the mind) (J. Beck, 1995). Beck (1967) theorises that most negative core beliefs fall within 
two broad types: those associated with helplessness, and those associated with un-lovability. 
These fundamental beliefs tend to be acquired early on in development during childhood as an 
attempt to make sense of the world. Quite often negative core beliefs will lie dormant until a 
negative environmental event occurs that triggers the negative core beliefs. These negative core 
beliefs have certain characteristics: they are normally over generalised, global, and absolute. An 
example of a core belief would be, ‘I am incompetent’. It is assumed that such beliefs form early 
in development, and often in relation to specific events or environmental stressors. An example 
of a stressor that may lead to the automatic belief that ‘I am incompetent’ would be an 
invalidating environment and overly critical primary caregiver. If a child is consistently told that 
they are useless, then they are at risk of believing what they are told and developing negative self 
concepts. In this way, the development of negative core beliefs can be regarded as an attempt by 
the child to make sense of their world so they can adapt to their environment and can attempt to 
obtain what they need from that environment.  
This hierarchy of thoughts ultimately contributes to the development of psychopathology.  
Core beliefs about helplessness that are developed in childhood may become activated due to 
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some life stressor. Once activated, core beliefs influence intermediate and negative automatic 
thoughts. Therefore, a basic core belief that one is useless may be activated due to a relationship 
breakup. This triggers intermediate assumptions like ‘when people are useless their partners 
leave them’, or ‘if I was capable, my partner would not want to leave’. The result of such 
thoughts being activated is that negative automatic thoughts occur. In this case, situations that are 
out of the person’s control, and not reflective of their competence, may be interpreted as being 
due to personal inadequacies. For example, the inability to keep a tidy house, or stay in touch 
with friends, may be normal in the context of a relationship break up, but for someone suffering 
major depression may be interpreted as evidence of a core belief of inability.  The result of 
experiencing constant negative automatic thoughts, activated by underlying intermediate and 
core beliefs, can be the development of pathological emotional and behavioural states as well as 
a self-perpetuating cycle where cognitions are developed and maintained through reinforcement 
(Roth & Fonagy, 2005). Cognitive behavioural claims about the causal relationship that links 
core, immediate, and negative automatic thoughts with behaviour and emotion, are of direct 
relevance to the metaphysical debate of philosophy of mind, because such claims are difficult to 
empirically verify. 
Basic cognitive therapy of the Beckian type ultimately relies on a particular 
conceptualisation of mental events. Outside of the discipline of clinical psychology, this 
conceptualisation is possibly contentious, and has been criticised extensively (e.g.Churchland, 
1981; Vanderwolf, 1998) Despite this, clinical psychology as a discipline largely ignores these 
areas of debate and focuses attention and consideration instead on refining therapeutic 
technology (Dawes, 1994; Westen, Thompson-Brenner, & Novotny, 2004, 2005). Therefore, an 
integration of the main concepts of cognitive behaviourally based clinical practice in the context 
of the metaphysical debate on the philosophy of mind may serve to improve theory development 
within the discipline of clinical psychology.  
Given the conceptualisation of mental events in CBT, the philosophical debate 
surrounding the psychological understanding of ‘mind’ is of particular relevance. At issue is: 1) 
what constitutes a ‘cognition’ or ‘belief,’ and the like; 2) whether the properties of ‘cognitions’ 
are such that they have a causal relation with behaviour and emotion as CBT theorists claim; 3) 
what the limits of our understanding of these cognitions are, and finally; 4) where such 
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knowledge/understanding of ‘cognitions’ fit within the broader framework of the science of 
psychology. 
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Chapter Three 
Philosophy of Mind 
Philosophy of mind 
The attempt to explain the mind has been of central concern to the efforts of philosophers 
for many centuries. Attempts to explain what conscious and unconscious mental events are have 
yielded many, often contrasting, views. With any academic discipline, certain ideas come into 
and out of popularity. Focusing on the possible metaphysical properties of the mind, the 
philosophy of mind continues to entertain lively debate as to the true nature of mental life. 
Although psychology attempts to understand the mind from a position closer to science than 
philosophy, philosophical positions on the nature of mind are still worth understanding. This is 
especially true for clinical psychology, whose theories often include metaphysical 
presuppositions. Due to the current limits of establishing a complete scientific understanding of 
the mind, brain and behaviour, issues such as whether or not thoughts have causal properties 
should include work from theoretical psychology and philosophy of mind. At the very least, 
psychology should remain aware of the current leading or central theories of what constitutes 
mind. 
Within philosophy and psychology there are several hypotheses about the relationship 
between the mind as understood at the personal level (behavioural and mental manifestation of 
lower ‘sub-personal’ brain processes) and the brain understood at the sub-personal level (events 
that occur at the physiological level). There have been a number of theories within the 
philosophy of mind that attempt to find a plausible interface between higher level cognitive 
functioning and lower level brain processes. Often referred to as the interface problem, this is in 
essence, the mind-brain problem. Of particular relevance to the discipline of clinical psychology 
is the issue of mental causation. Specifically, to what extent do the various positions on the 
nature of mind allow for mental events like beliefs and desires to be causally efficacious? How 
one conceptualises the causal nature of mental events depends on how one attempts to solve the 
interface problem and reconcile mental events with their neuro-physiological substrates.  
Therefore, empirical research needs to be combined with philosophical and theoretical 
knowledge to gain a comprehensive account of how the brain gives rise to the mind. 
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There are two main fundamental philosophical positions used to explain the nature of 
mind. The first is referred to as dualism, the second, monism. Dualism, as was first 
systematically explained by Descartes, considers mind and brain as consisting of different types 
of ‘stuff’. Essentially a spiritual/supernatural approach, dualism considers the brain to be a 
physical substance and the mind a thinking substance akin to the soul. However, there is no way 
to gain scientific knowledge of a soul/spirit which gives rise to mind, it follows that this is not a 
fruitful topic of scientific inquiry. This logical fact was explained by Campbell (1984, p. 14) in 
the four following propositions: 
(1) The human body is a material thing.  
(2) The human mind is a spiritual thing.  
(3) Mind and body interact.  
(4) Spirit and matter do not interact. 
One of these propositions must necessarily be false. Which proposition to reject depends on ones 
conceptualization of the mind and where it fits ontologically within the world (Campbell, 1984; 
Robb, 2003). Given clinical psychology’s commitment to a scientific, naturalist world view, 
proposition two must be rejected and a naturalist solution given for the interaction of mind and 
brain. Therefore, given that mental events arise from physical events in the brain, our focus must 
necessarily be on the nature of the mind/brain relationship and how we can know this 
relationship. This focus is essentially based on a monist/naturalist/physicalist premise. Monism, 
introduced by Spinoza, regards mind and brain to be made from the same ‘stuff’. Monism is 
primarily concerned with the reconciliation of the mind and its physiological substrate, the 
physical brain. For dualism there need be no resolution, for the two remain separate. Here 
reference to the mind includes concepts such as thoughts, beliefs, and feelings, all of which are 
related to complex behaviour.  
Understanding how the mind is related to complex behaviour is of particular relevance to 
a cognitively based clinical practice. The relationships between all mental events and behaviour 
occur on a number of different theoretical levels. Although, the concept of levels-of-explanation 
will be introduced later, a quick introduction is appropriate here. The mind can be conceptualised 
as being divided into ‘explanatory levels’(Bem, 2001; Bermudez, 2005; de Jong, 2002). The 
personal level of explanation of behaviour appeals to mental events rather than the physicality of 
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the brain.  An explanation at the personal level may be ‘Jane put her coat on because she thought 
it was going to rain’.  Sub-personal levels explain behaviour via the language of physiology of 
the brain and its processes. Thus, at the sub-personal level, this same action would be explained 
by reference to the physiological process by which Jane decided and then carried out the action 
of putting on her coat. The difference between, and relevance of, these different types of 
explanation of behaviour is a central issue for clinical psychology, a problem that can be 
informed by the relevant philosophical debate on the nature of mind. 
Dualism 
As just noted earlier, dualism holds that mind and brain are made of different stuff, and 
therefore are necessarily classified separately. There are three different dualist positions: 
interactionism, epiphenomenalism, and parallelism (Robinson, 2007). Interactionism states that 
while mental and physical events are made of different kinds of ontological substance, they do 
interact. That is, mental events made of mind stuff can causally interact with physical events 
through some type of connection. Epiphenomenalism states that mental events are merely a by-
product of physical events. Therefore, for epiphenomenalism, physical events can have a causal 
relationship with both physical and mental events, but mental events are not causally related to 
either. Lastly parallelism, sometimes known as psycho parallelism, assumes no causal 
relationship between the different mental and physical events, but considers them to run in 
parallel (Robinson, 2007). Dualist positions, as has been noted, are necessarily ruled out as being 
applicable to clinical psychology and psychology in general due to their incompatibility with 
naturalism and therefore, scientific knowledge.  
Monism 
Monism takes mind and brain to consist of the same sort of stuff. Within the monist 
position there are different variations that range along a continuum from non reductive to 
eliminativist in nature (Schafer, 2005).  At one end of the continuum lies a monism not dissimilar 
to dualism, which holds that mental events are born from, but not reducible to, their 
physiological substrates. This is the philosophical position most compatible with a scientist-
practitioner approach to clinical psychology, and can be loosely titled ‘explanatory dualism’ 
(Bem, 2001) or ‘autonomous mind’ (AM) . The position of the ‘autonomous mind’ states that 
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mind is irreducible to any sub-personal structure (Bermudez, 2005). In other words, a mental 
event is not just physiological. Although, it is accepted that mental states arise from the brain in 
some way, AM holds that the central principles or laws governing explanation at the 
commonsense level (i.e., how mental events may influence behaviour as opposed to physical 
events) are irreducible to the type of explanation at lower levels. AM states that there is a 
relationship between the personal and sub-personal levels-of-explanation, but that explanation at 
the personal level is not entirely confined to that of the lower levels. That is, complex human 
behaviour, which is often causally linked to what we commonly to refer to as mind, stems from, 
but can not be completely explained through, appeal to the sub-personal level of brain 
physiology. In this sense, AM is a naturalist position and although it does not appeal to thought 
stuff as separate from physical stuff, it does regard mental events as being important in the causal 
explanation of behaviour over and above their physical cause. The AM position is compatible 
with clinical psychology because, while still adhering to the tenets of naturalism and scientific 
method, it allows mental events to have causal properties. 
According to the AM position, any attempt to explain personal level phenomena strictly 
through sub-personal level explanation is necessarily descriptive as opposed to normative, and 
fails to capture the norm laden, rationality governed explanations at the personal level. For 
example, any explanation of decision making processes at the sub-personal level may explain 
how a person ought to reason but not how people actually go about reasoning (Bermudez, 2005). 
In other words, comparisons of the personal and sub-personal levels of mind are like comparing 
apples and oranges. Proponents of the non reductive AM claim that explanation at the personal 
level is hermeneutic, explaining intelligent behaviour by interpreting it as the behaviour of 
rational agents who follow normative principles rather than descriptive generalisations. Further, 
AM maintains that no type of explanation at the lower levels could capture the role of these 
normative ideals of rationality, consistency and, coherence (Bermudez, 2005). If following the 
AM thesis, propositional attitudes can feature causally in models of  psychopathology, and are 
also irreducible to explanation at a sub-personal level. Therefore, they need to be understood in a 
normative as well as in a descriptive fashion. From this point of view, the understanding of 
disordered behaviour or problematic symptom clusters cannot be completely understood in terms 
of neurophysiology. 
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The main difficulty with the AM position is how it addresses the interface problem: in 
particular, how to find common ground between personal and sub-personal levels-of-
explanation, and reconcile the mind with the brain, bearing in mind they are made of the same 
stuff. Everyone experiences what are referred to as thoughts, and from a naturalist position 
thoughts must somehow be born from the physical brain. But for the AM position, explanation at 
the personal level is concerned mainly with normative principles, as opposed to the descriptive 
principles that hold at sub-personal levels. Therefore, personal and sub-personal levels seem 
incompatible, weakening the explanatory worth of personal level explanation. However, within 
much of psychology, causal explanations are sought within the personal level (Bermudez, 2002). 
Of relevance to clinical psychology are those mental events often implicated in the aetiology of 
certain psychopathologies, for instance, depressogenic thinking. To be commensurable with most 
theory in clinical psychology, explanations of behaviour via mental events must include more 
than normative descriptions; they must also identify causal laws which allow them causal 
properties. Because AM regards mental events as non-reducible to their physical substrates, a 
solution needs to be found which allows for the mind to remain autonomous, while at the same 
time being linked to its physical substrate. Anomalous monism attempts to reconceptualise the 
autonomous mind in order to address this interface problem.  
Anomalous Monism 
Donald Davidson’s (1980) anomalous monism attempts to solve the interface problem by 
setting it up in a different way. Davidson states that although mental events cannot be discussed 
in terms of causal laws when described as commonsense explanations, they are nevertheless 
identical to physical events that do cause the behaviour that is being explained. The 
generalisations of commonsense psychology are not law-like but they describe processes which 
are linked to sub-personal law governed processes (Bermudez, 2005). Therefore, anomalous 
monism is a form of the token identity theory, which regards personal level explanation  as being 
an interpretive rather than theoretical (Botterill & Carruthers, 1999). If correct, anomalous 
monism would raise certain important problems for a scientific understanding at the 
commonsense/folk psychological level. It would affect knowledge claims of the causal power of 
mental events, which would be problematic for the way clinical psychology, social psychology, 
and personality psychology seek to explain (pathological) behaviour and emotion.  
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A major problem for anomalous monism is that it denies that nomological type causal 
laws hold at the personal level. Rather, it considers psychological states invoked at the personal 
level to be token identical, in the sense described immediately below, to the underlying physical 
structures that are themselves law governed (Bermudez, 2005). Therefore, anomalous monism 
appears at odds with explanatory approaches that seek to explain behaviour by appealing to 
causal laws operating at a non reducible personal level.  
Identity Theory 
The main difficulty with non reductive monist theories of the mind is the interface 
problem. Identity theory attempts to conceptualise the mind/brain split in a way that gets around 
the interface problem and overcomes anomalous monism’s problem with accounting for causal 
laws at the personal level. It does so by regarding mind as identical to the physical substrate, 
rather than merely being correlated with it (Smart, 2007). Identity theory is a reductive form of 
monism because it takes the mind and brain to be the same ontologically. Specifically, identity 
theory states that mental states and processes of the mind are identical to the physical states and 
processes of the brain. Identity theory can be found in a number of forms. Type identity assumes 
that a relationship holds between types of mental events and types of physical events. Token 
identity theory is similar, but more specific, stating that the relationship holds between specific 
mental occurrences and specific physiological occurrences rather than broader categories or 
types. One way to explain the difference between ‘type’ and ‘token’ is by considering the quote 
“love and love and love”:  There are five occurrences (tokens) of words, but only two kinds 
(type) of word that are repeated (Smart, 2007).  An acknowledged benefit of adopting the token  
identity approach is that it allows for the multiple realisability of mental events (Bermudez, 
2005; Bickle, 2006; Smart, 2007). Multiple realisability refers to similar mental events being 
caused by different physiological substrates. For example, consider the mental event associated 
with feeling pain, and whether it is possible for other mammals or animals to experience pain. 
Type identity theory may assume a particular type of brain event to occur, such that if an animal 
did not have this type of brain structure, then that animal could not feel pain akin to humans. 
Alternatively token identity theory allows for the experience of the same mental event, through 
different brain occurrences (Smart, 2007). In this respect, token identity theory is similar to 
functionalism.   
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Overall the identity theory allows for the causality of mental events because the laws that 
govern events at the physiological level also govern events at the personal level.  Identity theory, 
particularly the token variety, provides important advances in the concept of the mind by 
allowing mental events to be causally efficacious, while avoiding epiphenomenalism (Robb, 
1997, 2003). Although not without its critics, the identity theory provides important advances in 
the attempt to prove the appropriate metaphysics for causality required in many theoretical 
approaches to psychopathology and treatment in clinical psychology.    
The functional theory of mind 
The functionalist theory of mind  characterises mental events by their function, not their 
internal constitution (Levin, 2004). Functionalism is anti-reductionist (Carrier & Mittelstrass, 
1991) and has little direct consequence for the mind/brain problem because of its ontological 
neutrality. This is because patterns of behaviour at the personal level are invisible at lower 
explanatory levels. Therefore, mental events are classified by their functional relationship to the 
physiological substrate that causes them (Bermudez, 2005). 
Functionalism asserts that mental states differ from brain processes in their nature. 
Mental states are abstract functional states of the entire organism. They are specified by their 
causal potential, which is understood in terms of their ties to certain external stimuli, the 
reactions of the organism, and  the interaction of the organism’s other mental states. For 
example, pain is tied to external stimuli, causes a reaction in the organism, and is linked to other 
mental occurrences within that organism. Thus for functionalism, psychological concepts are 
conceived as functional types. Consider the distinction between the physical/material and 
functional properties of a mechanical water pump as an analogy for the relationship of 
neurophysiology to psychology. A physical/material description of the pump considers 
mechanical operations, for example, the turning of rods. A functional description describes the 
fulfilment of certain tasks, for example the pumping of water, without making assumptions about 
the mechanical realisations of this function (Bermudez, 2005). 
Carrier and Mittelstrass (1991) conceptualise functionalism as consistent with a 
materialist world view, and regard it as being similar to token identity theory because of its 
multiple realisability. Functionalism insists on the non-reduction of mentalistic terminology. 
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Only psychological concepts can formulate the conditions to be met by the functionally 
equivalent, but anatomically heterogeneous, neural instantiations of psychological states. To use 
the water pump analogy, there may be different types of water pump with different mechanisms 
but the same functional purpose. In this way, psychological descriptions classify neuro-
physiological phenomena into classes of functional equivalents (Carrier & Mittelstrass, 1991).   
Functionalism contrasts with the autonomous theory of mind in two ways. First, no sharp 
distinction is made between the causal generalisations of commonsense psychology and ordinary 
causal generalisations. Functionalism denies that causal explanation at the commonsense level is 
qualitatively different from that at the sub-personal level, whereas the autonomous mind would 
take the type of causal law to be different. Second, the interface problem becomes irrelevant 
from a functionalist perspective. The main premise of the functionalist theory of mind is that 
mental states are defined in terms of how they feature in psychological causal laws (Bermudez, 
2005).  
Functionalists believe that commonsense psychological explanations are causally 
efficacious, that general causal laws must govern causal relationships, and that these 
commonsense psychological explanations hold at the personal level (Bermudez, 2005). 
However, there are two main criticisms that proponents of the functionalist mind must overcome. 
The first is that explanation at the personal level is less descriptive and more normative than 
explanation at the sub-personal levels and therefore has difficulty accounting for causal 
generalisations. The second is that the causal generalisations of commonsense psychology tend 
to be rules of thumb rather than scientific causal laws (Bermudez, 2005). Although these 
criticisms provide a challenge for the functionalist theory of mind, functionalism is reasonably 
commensurable with psychological theory. 
A major benefit of functionalism for psychology is that mental states can be defined in 
terms of how they feature in psychological causal laws. This allows for commensurability 
between personal and sub-personal levels, as well as permitting the development of a distinctive 
characterisation of mental states (Bermudez, 2005). Therefore, functionalism provides an 
account of mind with greater salience to the theory and practice of clinical psychology, in which 
each mental state has an associated causal role directly relating to its governing causal law. Thus, 
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in this account of mind, functional roles are abstracted away from how physical events are 
implemented  (Bermudez, 2005).   
There are further distinctions to be made in an account of functionalism. The most 
prominent is between philosophical and psychological functionalism. While philosophical 
functionalism attempts to explain the occurrence of a mental event by citing the law-like 
generalisation under which it falls, known as the deductive nomological model of explanation, 
psychological functionalism is less trusting of our understanding of commonsense psychological 
explanation in terms of generalised laws. In other words, the philosophy of psychology does not 
consider the link between a particular propositional attitude and behaviour as indicative of a 
causal law. Generalised laws are things to explain, not things that do the explaining. That is, 
explanatory laws at the commonsense level can be identified and used to make predictions, but 
they do not explain the nature of the mental events that are implicated (Bermudez, 2005). 
Understanding the interface problem from a functionalist position can be achieved 
through the functional analysis of different abilities, and by breaking down the processes 
involved. Consider the distinction between long-term and short-term memory. This serves as a 
functional decomposition of memory into distinct types. Establishing this distinction has been 
made by gathering experimental data on empirically tested phenomena, for example recency and 
primacy effects. However, one can achieve further functional decomposition than short-term 
versus long-term memory. In a functional decomposition one  breaks down processes into 
components until one establishes the basic units, which comprise the higher level processes 
(Bermudez, 2005). At the neural level it is possible, through functional analysis, to anchor 
cognitive functions within their particular brain regions through the correlation of the location of 
brain damage with deficits in cognitive functioning (Bermudez, 2005). Therefore, functionalism 
is naturally compatible with the theory work in, and direction of, clinical psychology. While 
autonomy theorists hold that the information from cognitive and neuro-psychology has reduced 
importance in explaining behaviour at the personal level, functionalism makes integration of the 
personal and sub-personal levels easier. This is because it is far more sensitive to the complex, 
multi layered nature of psychological investigation (Bermudez, 2005). Further, functionalism 
allows for the existence of causal laws at the personal level. 
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The representational theory of mind 
The representational theory of mind is based on the idea of intentionality in which mental 
states are representative of an object, whether real or not (Lycan, 2006). The representational 
theory of mind has been influenced by developments in artificial intelligence, and has enjoyed 
considerable attention in psychology. The representational mind has implications for the 
interface problem and provides a good account of mental causation at the personal level. 
Whereas the functionalist concept of mind states that there are causal laws governing 
commonsense explanation, the representational concept of mind requires knowledge of the 
mechanism rather than simply establishing  the existence of causal laws (Bermudez, 2005). In 
other words, functionalism does not account well for the content of mental events.   
How does a particular belief, or combination of beliefs, cause a particular set of 
behaviours? This is a question of direct relevance to cognitive behavioural theory. The 
representational theory of mind, unlike functionalism, declares that mental events are causally 
efficacious via their content (Bermudez, 2005). The representational theory of mind allows for 
mental events to have content independent of their functional role, and distinguishes between the 
content and attitude of a proposition (Bermudez, 2005). To illustrate this point consider the 
following sentence, ‘Amy believes that the sky is particularly blue today’. In this sentence the 
content of the mental event is given by the words ‘the sky is particularly blue today’ and the 
attitude is represented by the verb ‘believes’. This division, which is not made in functionalism, 
allows for more flexibility and complexity when explaining the causal relationship between 
mental events and behaviour. 
The representational theory of mind accounts for the causal nature of mental events by 
considering the content of propositional attitudes to be analogous to the structure of sentences of 
an internal language of thought. Thus, the content of the mental event is used in a similar way to 
verbal reasoning and decision making (Bermudez 2002). The three basic tenets of the 
representational mind are: 
1. The causal dimension of propositional attitudes must be understood in terms of causal 
interactions between physical states. 
33 
 
2. These physical states have the structure of sentences and their sentential structure 
governs both their composition and their combination. 
3. The causal transitions between physical states respect the rational relations between the 
thoughts that those physical states represent, as a function of the intrinsic properties of 
those physical states.  
While not uncontroversial, the representational mind provides a naturalistic explanation of the 
mind which allows for mental events to be causally efficacious via their inherent properties. If, in 
the representational theory of mind, a propositional attitude can be causally related to behaviour 
in virtue of its content, then the representational theory of mind is commensurable with the types 
of theory often generated to explain phenomena in clinical and related areas of psychology. This 
is because theories in clinical psychology often rely on the causal efficacy of mental events to 
explain phenomena. 
The representational theory of mind, through introducing causal thought content in 
personal level explanations, provides a plausible explanation of how mental events can be 
causally efficacious. However, this poses certain difficulties, primarily, how to account for 
causation by appealing to the content of mental events. The inclusion of the content of mental 
events in causal explanation gives the representational theory of mind an explanatory edge over 
functionalism. Functionalism does not explain why mental events would interact in any rational 
manner with behaviour, assuming that this is part of the functional role (Lycan, 2006). The 
challenge for the representational theory of mind is, therefore, to explain the causal relationship 
between physical structures that occur by virtue of the rational relationships that hold between 
the propositional contents they realize (Bermudez 2002). The way it achieves this is to assume a 
relationship between the content of the propositional attitude and the vehicle of that propositional 
attitude. The vehicle of the propositional attitude is assumed to be like complex symbols in an 
‘internal language of thought’. The representational theory of mind holds that the relationship 
between a propositional attitude and its vehicle is similar to the relationship between syntax and 
semantics. The syntax provides the formulae or rules and the semantics provides meaning 
(Bermudez, 2005).  
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Consider the nature of the vehicle of the content of the propositional attitude. Within the 
vehicle of the belief that ‘the sky is falling’, it should be possible to recognise the basic elements 
of the propositional attitude. Here the propositional attitude is similar to the basic semantic 
content of a sentence (sky, falling, etc). The basic units are represented by symbols which are 
structural isomorphisms of the physical elements that occur on the algorithmic level of brain 
processing (basic sense data that is pieced together according to some cognitive algorithm). The 
physical elements (symbols) of the proposition vehicle are combined in a manner that maps onto 
the way concepts combine to make a sentence that represents a propositional attitude. In this way 
unlimited combinations of propositional attitudes are possible, because the basic units can be 
used in multiple combinations, as is the case with written language. Such combinations are 
thought to follow natural logical form (Bermudez, 2005). 
By virtue of its focus on the importance of the content of mental events, the 
representational theory of mind is compatible with cognitive behavioural approaches in clinical 
psychology. Conceptualising the content of mental events as being expressed by a syntax-like 
vehicle, the representational theory of mind offers CBT the opportunity to justify its claim that 
cognitions can relate causally to feelings and behaviours by virtue of their inherent properties.  
The eliminativist mind and radical behaviourism 
Eliminative materialism is an extreme monist position that considers all human 
behavioural phenomena to be explainable by appeal to the micro-structure of the brain. 
Eliminativism rules out all but purely physical explanations of behavioural phenomena. 
Therefore, all mentalistic causal hypotheses are false. Therefore, the eliminative theory of mind 
regards commonsense mentalistic explanation as false. For example, explanations like “John hit 
Sam, because John believed that Sam broke the rules of the game, which made him angry” have 
no scientific worth in explaining behaviour, according to eliminativism. An eliminativist 
explanation would attempt to explain the same situation on a sub-personal, physical level. To put 
the explanation in eliminativist language, “The behaviour was executed after x cluster of neurons 
fired, subsequent to information y being received through the perceptual system”. Eliminativism 
is a widely applied epistemological position within the ‘pure sciences’ like physics, but not 
necessarily within the biological sciences, and seeks to contain explanation of phenomena 
through the causal laws working at the lowest explanatory level (Ramsey, 2007). 
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The eliminative position can be divided into two factions, those that believe mental 
events do not exist, only brain states exist (the irony of this sentence has humoured many 
cognitive theorists), and those that believe that mental events do exist, but that we have 
misunderstood their nature, and that they will be explained, in the future, through appeal to their 
neuro-physiological substrate (Ramsey, 2007). 
The case for a strong reductionism of mind, like eliminativism, poses a number of 
difficult questions for psychology. For example, Vanderwolf (1998) states that “the fundamental 
theoretical basis of the field remains rooted in ancient mentalistic concepts. Thus it is commonly 
accepted that Aristotelian subdivisions of the mind such as perception, emotion, cognition, and 
memory provide valid explanations of human behaviour” and that “in contrast to other scientific 
fields such as chemistry, biochemistry, molecular biology and physics, psychology has made 
very limited progress in the past century despite strong institutional support” (p. 135). Similar to 
the theories of eliminativism and strong reductionism, Vanderwolf regards the way that 
psychology conceptualises mentalistic phenomena to be false.  
Eliminative materialism dictates that all behaviour which occurs on the personal level 
will ultimately be understood in the laws and language of the lowest level of explanation. While 
eliminativism challenges foundational psychological theory, it is not without criticism, with 
many considering it fundamentally flawed (Bermudez, 2005). The explanation of behavioural 
phenomena strictly by appeal to the lowest level of explanation, or the smallest unit of analysis, 
is not common in the biological sciences. For example, a tree could be described and explained 
through the laws and language of its physical properties but its ‘tree’ categorisation would still 
be useful (Smart, 2007).  The main problem with an eliminativist position within the physical 
sciences is that the meaningful properties present at the higher levels-of-explanation are not 
captured. 
Radical behaviourism, poses the same difficulties for professional psychology’s use of 
mentalistic concepts in its theory and practice, as does eliminativism.  According to radical 
behaviourism, what we think of as mental events are unable to be causally efficacious, because 
these ‘mental events’ are not considered causes of behaviour but behaviour in their own right, to 
be explained, not to do the explaining (Plaud, 2001).  Radical behaviourism adopts its own frame 
of reference, as the science of behaviour and not the mind. Further, radical behaviourism 
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distinguishes itself from other related but separate disciplines such as neurophysiology. Both 
radical behaviourist and eliminative materialist positions directly question the usefulness and 
validity of the mentalistic concepts that feature heavily in the theory and practice of clinical 
psychology (Plaud, 2001). Such determined challenges to the validity of the foundational tenets 
of clinical psychology need to be addressed, both with respect to theory construction, as well as 
more generally within clinical, and other parts of psychology. 
 There exist a number of competing philosophies of mind, which differ in their 
commensurability with the theories and practices of clinical psychology. Given that an advanced 
physical understanding of the brain is currently unavailable, theorising about the nature of 
subjectively experienced mental events, above and beyond that which can be directly measured, 
is necessary. Both psychology and philosophy of mind are directly concerned with, and make 
assumptions about, the nature of mind. However, while some of the advances in psychology 
have had an influence on the philosophy of mind (for example, cognitive psychology) the 
influence of philosophy on psychology is less obvious. If the development of theory and practice 
in clinical psychology is to be firmly grounded in current knowledge of the brain and the mind, it 
must be aware of and be guided by not only current knowledge in wider psychology, but also 
other related disciplines. As demonstrated in this chapter, while there are philosophical theories 
of mind which challenge the plausibility of concepts and central theories adopted in clinical 
psychology, there are also philosophical perspectives that are congruent with these concepts and 
theories. Most importantly, from a metaphysical stance, it is possible to conceptualise causally 
efficacious mental events that are grounded within a naturalistic world view.    
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Chapter Four 
Levels-of-explanation: A framework of reference 
Exploring the mind: The combination of theory and data 
The essence of the mind/brain problem can be described in the following way. Firstly, 
subjective experience exists for each individual alone; my experience of pain is not felt by you; I 
could not even really describe it to you. Secondly, when I experience pain, a physical event 
occurs in the brain that can be observed by others, that can be explained in the language of the 
natural sciences, and that exists in the world of physical material. Thirdly, the first point 
(subjective experience) depends wholly on the second point (physical brain event). This is 
referred to as the mind/brain problem (Humphrey, 1992). When stated this way, the solution to 
the mind/brain problem should include both theorising the metaphysics of mind as well as 
knowledge of the physicality of the brain. It is within the discipline of psychology that interest in 
the subjective experience of mind and physical events of the brain, naturally intersect.  
When investigating the mind within the discipline of psychology, causal mysteries need 
to be avoided and naturalism must take precedence, because to appeal to any kind of spirit/body 
dualism would be to render the scientific investigation into clinical phenomena irrelevant. Given 
that Cartesian Dualism is firmly rejected in any attempt to understand the mind from a scientific 
point of view, the task at hand is “how do we conceptualise the mind?” To do this, an 
amalgamation of metaphysical theorising and empirical knowledge is needed. Integrating these 
different types of knowledge, about the nature of the mind now becomes the focus of inquiry. In 
order to develop a defendable theory on the mind it is important first to establish a general 
framework of understanding to account for the empirical basis for theorising about the nature of 
mind, and second, to successfully merge theoretical and empirical evidence.  
Levels-of-explanation 
Psychological theory is predominantly concerned with understanding the brain and its 
processes, whereas the philosophy of mind is predominantly concerned with metaphysics. To 
understand the mind in its entirety, an integration of the two must be achieved. A recently 
promulgated paradigm with which we can organise our conceptualisation of how the mind 
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produces complex behaviour is to consider the mind as working at different explanatory levels, 
extending from the molecular level up to higher cognitive functioning. This is known as a 
“levels-of-explanation” framework (Bem, 2001; Bermudez, 2005; de Jong, 2002).   
Psychological theorists have established that these different explanatory levels form a 
clearly defined hierarchy (Bermudez, 2005). A significant benefit of this approach is that by 
conceptualising the mind as operating on different levels one is presented with a clear framework 
with which to piece together the different scientific and philosophical accounts of mind. To 
illustrate the utility of a levels-of-explanation framework, consider the example given by Marr 
(Marr, 1982). In his example Marr uses the visual system to describe how such a hierarchy of 
explanatory levels would work. He proposes three sub-personal levels: the computational level, 
the representational and algorithmic level, and the hardware implementation level. The 
computational explanatory level identifies the information that the cognitive system processes (in 
put) and that which it produces (out put). The algorithmic level contains information processing 
instructions or algorithms, and solves problems posed at the computational level. The 
implementation level is concerned with the neuro-physiological substrates of the algorithm. 
Evidence of cognitive dissociations in clinical neuropsychology are used to support the 
computational level of explanation, psychophysics is used at the algorithmic level, and 
physiology at the implementation level (Bermudez, 2005). These three levels-of-explanation are 
equivalent to what psychologists call modular cognitive processes. These processes are lower 
level cognitive processes that provide rapid solutions to highly determinate problems (Bermudez, 
2005), unlike non-modular, higher level cognitive processes.  
The distinction between modular and non-modular processes is analogous to the division 
between personal and sub-personal levels-of-explanation. The personal level of explanation 
seeks to explain and predict behaviour by assuming that humans have minds which allow them 
to behave as intelligent agents (Bermudez, 2005). The personal level of explanation is placed at 
the top of the hierarchical levels-of-explanation framework and is often referred to in psychology 
as ‘folk’, ‘common sense’, or ‘naive psychology’. Empirical investigation at the personal level of 
mind is difficult due to the complexity of the subject matter.  
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Because of the limitations of knowing mental events empirically, the validity of 
explanation at the personal level is a source of continual debate.  It can be argued that personal 
level explanation provides greater understanding of behaviour than eliminativist paradigms. 
Consider the following point as to the explanatory worth of personal level explanation, which 
will be covered in greater detail later in this chapter. While despairing of gaining any 
understanding of consciousness, Gottfried Leibniz (1714), compared the mind to an imagined 
tour of a flour mill. He stated that we could enter the mill and walk around and observe the 
motion of the machines, just as we may examine the physicality of the brain. However, the 
physical operation of the mill is but one aspect of its operation. An operating mill is more than 
the sum of its physical components. It is a place where grain is ground to make flour for bread. It 
is a place of employment and therefore fulfils a societal necessity. These concepts are integral to 
any explanation of a mill. One could miss these aspects if, in a visit, all one saw was a collection 
of moving metal parts (Humphrey, 1992). The same is true for the human mind. When 
investigating the mind, it is easy to fall into the trap of adopting an altogether too narrow 
conceptualisation of the brain and its processes. Ultimately, any comprehensive explanation of 
the mind must take into account all that the brain produces, from neuro-chemical impulses to the 
complex behaviour of intelligent beings which occurs within a social context. 
Within a levels-of-explanation framework, explanation of behaviour can be achieved by 
appealing to causal factors within the same explanatory level or across levels, otherwise referred 
to as ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ explanation. Consider the example of a ball breaking a window. 
When asking “why did the window break?” a horizontal explanation may be that the ball hit it. 
However, this still leaves unanswered a string of ‘why’ questions. Why did the window break 
when the ball hit it? With this question, an appeal is made to vertical explanation, which 
describes the physics involved (Bermudez, 2005). This analogy can be applied to psychological 
explanation. The division of the mind into a hierarchical structure allows different disciplines 
like neurophysiology and cognitive psychology to retain their academic integrity, while allowing 
for the commensurability of content. While horizontal explanation at the personal level appeals 
to the causal nature of mental events, the notion of a vertical explanation appeals to lower levels 
in order to provide the physiological basis of behaviour.  
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Presently, abnormal and clinical psychology primarily provide horizontal explanation of 
the aetiological role mental events play in development of psychopathology. For example, it is 
possible to observe and study the correlation between cognitive style and the presence or absence 
of depression, but the explanation of the causal role of mental events through the laws and 
language of the sub-personal is not seriously addressed in clinical psychology. Can mental events 
have a causal relationship with behaviour and emotion? And can this type of causal explanation 
ever be understood by the laws and language of sub-personal levels-of-explanation? The answers 
to these types of questions need to be better understood in clinical psychology. At stake is the 
validity of the knowledge base of cognitive approaches in clinical psychology. For example, is it 
possible, or even necessary, to scientifically understand, in psychological terms, ‘depressogenic’ 
thinking, which is often regarded as an aetiological factor in depression? Considering that claims 
made about the causal nature of cognitions in CBT theory are often manifest at the personal 
level, the domain of commonsense psychology and its ability to explain human behaviour needs 
to be considered in detail. 
The adoption of a levels-of-explanation framework allows for the improvement of our 
understanding of the mind and provides reference points for clinical psychology to develop 
theories about the nature of mental events. Allowing for commonsense psychological 
explanation at the personal level, while at the same time uncovering causal relationships with 
sub-personal modular levels-of-explanation, is essential to the understanding pathological 
behaviour. Such an approach would not only identify relationships between the current 
knowledge we have of the mind and the brain, but also provide direction for research and 
provide the grounding for a wider unifying theory development within psychology. 
The benefits of adopting a levels-of-explanation framework of mind 
Clinical and abnormal psychology cover a wide variety of subject matter. To illustrate 
this point, consider the wide range of aetiological explanations given for the development of 
depressive disorders in a typical third year Abnormal Psychology text book. These cover: 
biological dimensions, including familial and genetic influences, neurotransmitter systems, the 
endocrine system, sleep and circadian rhythms, and brain wave activity; psychological 
dimensions, including stressful life events, learned helplessness, and negative cognitive styles; 
and social and cultural dimensions, including marital relations, gender issues, and social support. 
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These are all well established as causal factors in the development of depression, but do they 
have the same epistemological worth?  In answering this question, it is prudent to consider the 
different research methods typically used to gather this information. The genetic contribution to 
depression is mainly established using research methods from the social sciences. These methods 
typically have large sample sizes and look to establish whether or not there is a higher likelihood 
of the co-occurrence of a specific disorder in relatives than in the general public. This type of 
study yields different knowledge than does experimental research, which typically involves the 
manipulation of an independent variable and the measurement of a dependent variable and can 
make stronger claims about causality. This differentiation between types of aetiological 
information may not be important within specific sub disciplines of psychology. A researcher 
interested in the neurophysiology of depression does not need to incorporate cognitive style into 
their research. However, a clinical psychologist necessarily handles a wide variety of 
epistemologically different information. They do so as part of professional practice, whereby an 
attempt is made to gather all relevant aetiological information in order to formulate clients’ 
problems and inform effective treatment. For this reason, clinical psychology has a lot to gain 
from the establishment of an overarching theoretical framework for psychology. 
A levels-of-explanation approach is consistent with the theory of autonomous mind for it 
allows the basis of behaviour to be physical, but it denies that explanation of behaviour can be 
reduced purely to the laws and language of the physicality of the brain. It also encompasses the 
different sub disciplines concerned with the mind in a coherent and useful manner, and allows a 
clinician to organise information in a way that makes sense when formulating cases. Importantly, 
such a levels-of-explanation model allows for commonsense explanation of behaviour to be 
included when explaining the behaviour of intelligent agents, while still adhering to a naturalist 
world view. Commonsense explanations of behaviour are often utilised in the profession of 
clinical psychology in establishing the importance of causal mental events.      
The evolution, and importance, of the qualia of subjectively experienced mental events  
When applying philosophies of mind to the explanation of behaviour, two broad and 
opposing positions emerge: eliminative materialism and the autonomous mind. Both theorise 
about causal antecedents of behaviour and whether mental events genuinely exist. Put simply, 
the issue at hand is whether one can rely on purely physical explanations of behaviour, or 
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whether one also needs to acknowledge an approach that employs meaningful, context driven 
personal level explanations. Although an eliminativist position would consider meaningful 
explanation redundant, because all behaviour should be explained in physical terms, certain 
phenomena cannot be explained from a purely physicalist position. Robert Maunder (1995) 
highlights the weaknesses of a purely physical approach to the explanation of behavioural 
phenomena. He cites studies investigating the social behaviour of Veret monkeys. When a male 
Veret monkey assumes a dominant role within their social group, neuro-physiological changes 
occur; principally, increased serotonin levels are observed. If one was attempting to understand 
why the monkey was acting more violently (a question of specific relevance to forensic 
psychology), a reductionist position would conclude that the aggression was caused by an 
increase in levels of serotonin. Although not incorrect, a physical explanation is insufficient to 
fully explain the observed phenomenon because the observed increase in serotonin levels 
occurred in response to the monkeys’ experienced change in their social situation. An 
explanation of the workings of a social hierarchy and ones position in it cannot be done in the 
language of physiology alone. This highlights the problem of what, if any, importance should be 
given to the qualia of a mental event. If we had the ability to describe qualia in terms of the 
physical process underlying it, would that explanation capture the subjective experience of what 
it feels like to be ‘top dog’? Can a blind neurologist, who knows everything about the physical 
process of seeing know what its like to see colour? (Edelman & Tononi, 2000). If not, then is a 
physical explanation enough? The answer seems to be no in the case of the Veret monkey 
because a non physical event caused the physical reaction by virtue of its content or meaning. 
Thus, an eliminativist approach seems inadequate.  
Establishing a suitable account of why meaningful explanations, based on the qualia of 
subjectively experienced mental events, are an essential component of explaining the behaviour 
of intelligent agents is difficult because of the obstacles to knowing the qualia of mental events 
objectively. If subjectively experienced mental events cannot be measured or studied objectively, 
then how are they to be justified scientifically? One way in which it is possible to establish the 
grounds for including the qualia of mental events as necessary for a complete explanation of 
behaviour, is by considering the evolution of the mind. One of the main theorists of the evolution 
of mind is Daniel Dennett (1996) whose ideas on the nature of mind are set firmly within an 
evolutionary context. Although it is outside the limits of this thesis to cover Dennett’s ideas in 
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thorough detail, there are certain insightful points he makes which inform our concept of mind. 
Of particular relevance is the importance, and evolution, of how humans represent the world in 
their subjective experience. There are several important tenets that form the basis of Dennett’s 
argument, one of which states that evolutionary changes do not effect the discarding of previous 
adaptations (Dennett, 1996). The usefulness of this tenet is that the mind looses some of its 
mystique and allows us to look at our evolutionary past, close human relatives (primates), and 
other animals for knowledge of the nature of mind. This tenet states that it would not make sense 
for an organism to completely reconfigure an adaptation. Instead it would further mould what is 
already present. This is seen to some extent in the modular conceptualisation of the evolution of 
primate binocular vision. D Marr (1982) elaborated the principle of modular design, 
conceptualising the visual cortex as being made up of a series of separate representations in the 
mind rather than giving a single map of the whole visual field. In this respect, a small 
change/adaptation does not mean that the whole picture needs to change in its entirety. This 
allows for the breakdown of the visual field, and gives a more feasible platform from which we 
can contemplate the occurrence of evolutionary mutations (Gregory, 1987). Thus, a modular 
approach allows for the addition of adaptations without complete reconfiguration of the 
mechanism. Similarly, the ‘minds’ of our distant primate ancestors and their modern equivalents 
are the basis for the mind we now know. When considering the nature of mind and mental events 
we need to consider the evolutionary advantages facilitated by the primate mind as well as the 
way in which our mind differs from other mammals, primates in particular (Dennett, 1996). 
Herein may be the answer as to what makes the human mind what it is.  
According to Dennett (1996), one of the main differences thought to exist between 
humans and their closest genetic relatives, is that humans have evolved with the ability, closely 
related the development of language, to produce meaningful mental representations of objects 
that occur in the natural world, and can manipulate these mental representations (Dennett 1996). 
Humans share with other mammals the ability to distinguish and therefore label important 
aspects of our environment. This is an essential skill for survival; consider, for example, the 
rabbit who has to distinguish its predator, the fox, from its surroundings. Further, vision, as 
opposed to the other senses, has played a unique role in the evolution of the human brain. The 
relatively large human neo-cortex, which facilitates greater cognitive capacities, is thought to 
have developed in our primate ancestors because of their increasing reliance on processing visual 
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information. Our early, prosimian-like primate ancestors, who developed forward facing eyes, 
displayed a related enlargement of the neo-cortex in the occipital and temporal lobes (Gregory, 
1987). Further, the evolutionary path which lead the primates down from the trees, necessitated 
the development of visually based cognitive/memory skills in order to detect and track seasonal 
food sources over large tracts of land (Gregory, 1987). Therefore, visually based cognitive 
processes can be considered essential to the evolution of our current mind. Another important 
evolutionary milestone, which is related to the evolution of visual/spatial abilities, is the 
development of complex social groupings. Some important physiological differences between 
the two main primate groups, specifically in the rhinarium (the area between the upper lip and 
the nostrils), demonstrate the importance of, and link between, visual ability and social 
interaction for the evolution of the mind. An increasing social complexity, which contributed to 
the development of the proportionately larger necortex of Homo sapiens, is found in primates 
with a furry rhinarium as opposed to those with a rhinarium consisting of moist mucosal tissue. 
A furry rhinarium allows greater facial expression, and therefore, in social interaction, olfactory 
cues become much less important than facial and visual cues (Gregory, 1987). While at some 
stage in our evolutionary past we may have had a similar mind to the other mammals, our 
cognitive capacity, and the ability to discriminate important objects in the environment, has been 
superimposed over our mammalian proto-mind and has progressed and adapted. This is because 
of, among other factors, the increasing importance of visually based abilities and increased social 
complexity.  
As a result, humans are able to voluntarily conjure up a thought/image/ mental event of 
the concepts our mental life consist of and manipulate them. These abilities are also mediated by 
the use of language (Dennett, 1996). In making this point, Dennett (1996) refers to those studies 
that have famously established that primates and other animals have the ability to problem solve 
and carry out tasks that rely on humanlike cognitive ability. For Dennett (1996), the difference is 
in the flexibility of representational thinking. One person could explain an absurd scenario to 
another, who would then be able to form a mental image of that scenario with relative ease. For 
example, picture a small dog dressed as a policeman, smoking a cigar while balancing on a beach 
ball. This type of mental flexibility is unlikely to occur in other mammals (Dennett 1996). Other 
animals more than likely have representations of the environment, but humans can form 
representations of representations. For example, one can draw a map of Paris, and thus, not only 
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see Paris, the capital of France, in its physicality, as other animals may do, but one can also make 
a map or draw a picture of what one sees and recognise it as a representation of Paris (Dennett, 
1996). These abilities are likely to be the product of our unique evolutionary path; a path which 
has resulted in highly evolved cognitive capacities born from the importance of visual and social 
ability. 
When considering the possible evolution of the mind, some of the mystery which has 
surrounded its nature is reduced. If we adopt a naturalist position on the nature of mind, then the 
phenomenon we know of as the mind is believed to have evolved from the ‘precursor to mind’ 
that our evolutionary ancestors experienced. This information helps to inform current 
conceptualisations of the mind and helps ground metaphysical debate in a naturalist context. 
Considering mind from an evolutionary perspective suggests the importance of the development 
of visual abilities and therefore, the ability to meaningfully represent the world via subjective 
experience. Furthermore, social interaction is also an important piece of the puzzle in the 
evolution of mind. The initial evolutionary benefits that progress in these areas provided set a 
platform from which increasingly complex cognitive abilities, and therefore, increasingly 
complex ways of interacting with and representing the world, developed. On this view, the way 
humans consciously, meaningfully, and subjectively represent the world is central to their 
functioning within that world. 
Commonsense explanation of behaviour 
The attempt to retain the importance of qualia in the explanatory process is one part of 
the mind/body problem and is a product of the specific difficulty of systematically understanding 
behaviour from a commonsense approach. This problem is of central importance to the field of 
clinical psychology, which is invested in the value of commonsense explanations of behaviour, 
separate from purely physical explanations. Further, as already stated, the explanation of 
complex behaviour in purely physiological terms is not possible given our current understanding 
of the brain. Given that a comprehensive physical explanation of behaviour will always elude us, 
is the employment of mentalistic concepts in commonsense explanation useful? What would 
such explanation look like? And, can such explanation be systematic and scientific when 
employed in understanding behaviour?  These questions are of particular relevance to 
psychology in general and clinical psychology in particular.  
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The term ‘folk’ or ‘commonsense psychology’ refers to the natural human tendency to 
explain the behaviour of others. Explanations of this sort often appeal to particular mental states 
such as beliefs, desires, and thoughts as causes of behaviour, and are therefore, concerned with 
the qualia or nature of those mental events (Nichols, 2004). This type of commonsense 
explanation is similar to the Veret monkey example and is at odds with a reductionist, purely 
physical, explanation of human behaviour. Applied to the Veret monkeys’ social hierarchy, a 
commonsense explanation might look like this: ‘The monkey has become more aggressive, 
because through the death of the former alpha male, he finds himself in the dominant role. The 
reason that, as the alpha male, he now becomes more aggressive is that he believes he needs to 
protect his social position from other contenders for the dominant role’. There has been no 
appeal to neurophysiology here; rather, explanation is given in a particular and appropriate 
manner as to why the monkey is acting aggressively. Therefore, both commonsense and 
physically based explanations of behaviour provide important information as to what causes 
behaviour. Both need to be incorporated in a comprehensive explanatory model.   
Commonsense psychological explanations rest on the idea of intentionality, the idea that 
behaviour can be explained by considering an entity acting as if it were a rational agent, 
choosing to behave a certain way caused by mental events. Importantly, if one can understand 
why an agent acts the way it does, one can predict further behaviour (Dennett, 1996). From an 
evolutionary perspective, the ability to hypothesise and explain why others carry out certain 
actions is of great value for animals that live in social groups (Smith & Mackie, 2000). But this 
type of explanation has a number of flaws which are often demonstrated in common 
misunderstandings. For example, your laughter at my jokes may simply be politeness, but I may 
misinterpret your laughter as genuine amusement. Humans have become highly adept at making 
social judgements (Smith & Mackie, 2000).The reason for the high likelihood of error is that 
commonsense psychological explanation attempts to explain the very complex phenomena of the 
behaviour of intelligent agents. To further examine commonsense explanation and why this kind 
of explanation is prone to error, it is helpful to look at the different explanatory stances described 
by Dennett (1996) and the reasons for adopting these stances.  
If it is assumed that the goal of this commonsense explanation is to best understand 
human behaviour using the means at our disposal rather than appealing to the possibilities of 
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future knowledge, or discounting current knowledge because of its current epistemological 
failings, then a pragmatic approach should be taken, which takes into account the necessity of 
understanding the behaviour of intelligent agents in the present. It is possible to identify three 
basic approaches to the explanation of behaviour that vary in their usefulness according to the 
complexity of the phenomena they attempt to explain. These are the physical, the design, and the 
intentional explanatory approaches (Dennett, 1996). Firstly, the physical stance is consistent with 
eliminativism and attempts to describe phenomena in terms of physical properties. However, due 
to our limited knowledge of the functioning of the brain, the physical stance is currently 
unhelpful as a sufficient approach to understanding the behaviour of intelligent agents. This is 
not to say that there are entities which operate outside physical laws, but rather, that we cannot 
apply them in a complete explanation of behaviour – a point noted previously. When making a 
prediction from the physical stance we can be quite certain that the prediction is correct (Dennett, 
1996).  
A second approach is that of the design stance. The design stance is more flawed than the 
physical stance because it makes more assumptions when attempting to predict outcomes. This 
position is based on the assumption that things which are designed, are designed to work in a 
particular manner. Consider the example of an alarm clock. An alarm clock is a physical object 
whose ‘behaviour’ can be predicted via the physical stance but to do so would be time 
consuming, and for most, beyond the limited knowledge of the principles involved (physics, 
electronics, etc). Alternatively, one can predict the behaviour of an entity based on its design. 
Therefore, one can predict, due to the designed purpose of the alarm clock, that if you push 
certain buttons in the correct sequence then, after a certain period of time, the alarm will go off.  
With the design stance, one makes assumptions that the object will act in certain way. This 
provides a very attractive short cut in explaining the behaviour of the alarm clock, but increases 
the risk of making a mistake because faults occur. If you were in possession of a faulty alarm 
clock, your assumption about the behaviour of that alarm clock would change based on the 
physical stance but not on the design stance (and as a result you may be late for work). The 
design stance works well in predicting the behaviour of manufactured objects, but it also works 
well with things ‘designed’ by mother nature (Dennett, 1996) 
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Last is the intentional stance. The intentional stance treats the object-to-be-explained as 
an agent of sorts, and explains actions in terms of intentions. It is more swift than both the 
physical and the design stance but is less safe in terms of precise prediction (Dennett, 1996). 
Applied to the example of the alarm clock, we may explain its behaviour using the intentional 
stance in the following way: ‘We have given the alarm clock a command which it understands; 
therefore, it will be able to perceive when the time has come to make noise. When it believes that 
that the time has come, it will be motivated to make the alarm noise and subsequently wake you 
up’. This type of explanation is utilised because of its practicality, and is used not only for 
inanimate objects but also living things (Dennett, 1996). Consider the behaviour of a honey bee. 
From an intentional stance, one could predict that any particular bee will spend the summer 
collecting pollen so that it can be made into honey to increase the survival chances of the hive 
over the winter. One could say that the bee is motivated to do this because it is worried about its 
chances of getting through the winter. You could also say that the bee is concerned about his 
fellow bees in the hive and therefore, does not hide its pollen away for itself but adds to the 
common store. The result is that you have predicted a behavioural outcome based on the 
supposed intentions of the bee, with the help of the knowledge you have about the behavioural 
patterns of honey bees. In this case you could be almost certain that your prediction would be 
correct, despite the fact that the bee may or may not have the conscious experience of subjective 
thought like ‘I better collect some pollen or I will starve during the winter’ or ‘I will take this 
pollen to the hive and not be selfish myself because that will help out my bee friends’. The 
intentional stance can correctly predict the behaviour in this instance, whether or not the agent 
experiences those intentions. The alternative would be to explain the actions of the bee referring 
solely to physical laws – an eliminativist approach. As discussed, this is not possible given our 
limited knowledge of how the brain as a whole gives rise to behaviour.  
It is the intentional stance shortcut that is used in commonsense psychological 
explanations of behaviour. The prediction of the actions of intelligent agents can be made using 
the intentional stance. This approach has its problems but it works and has proven a valuable tool 
during our evolution (Smith & Mackie, 2000). The intentional stance may provide an 
understanding of our environment that is easier to undertake than other, more rigorous forms of 
prediction. However, despite its usefulness, the question needs to be asked: can this natural 
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ability be used to gain knowledge analogous to scientific knowledge? In other words, can the 
harness of scientific method be applied to the horse of folk psychology?  
This is a serious hurdle to the commonsense explanation of human behaviour, because as 
is evident in cognitive and social psychology, human reasoning is naturally fraught with many 
errors of logic, in part due to the vast amount of information we need to process at any given 
moment (Smith & Mackie, 2000). However, it has been established that commonsense 
explanations of behaviour by appeal to mental events is useful, if at times flawed. The question 
of whether our commonsense, intuitive process of understanding the behaviour others, can be 
made scientific needs to be answered for a number of reasons. Autonomous mind theories state 
that purely physical/reductionist explanations fail to address the important concepts of 
intentionality or phenomenality which are necessary to understand human behaviour. Thus it 
seems clear that a better understanding of behaviour than is provided by the purely physical 
stance is needed. Further, psychology, and clinical psychology in particular, have invested 
interest in explaining why behaviour occurs – psychology because it is the science of brain and 
behaviour and clinical psychology because, not only does it utilise the scientific knowledge 
gathered within the wider discipline of psychology, but also because it applies that information 
idiographically. Clinical psychology applies that knowledge to specific individuals in both 
explaining why a particular presentation has arisen but it also gives advice on how to change 
pathological patterns of behaviour (Brendel, 2000).   
The answer to the question, can we use scientific methods to construct commonsense 
explanations of behaviour, or explanations from the intentional stance?, is most probably ‘yes’. 
Social psychology, as a sub-discipline of psychology, has defended the causal relationship of 
beliefs, attitudes, and socially determined norms to behaviour in the face of the earlier 
behavioural/positivist dominance in psychology (Smith & Mackie, 2000). It continues to 
describe the rich complexity of human behaviour, within a social context through appeal to the 
effect of meaningful, subjective mental events on behaviour. Take as an example, one of the first 
phenomena to be labelled part of ‘social psychology’. Norman Triplett, in 1898 found through 
experimentation that people tended to perform quicker when winding fishing line onto reels in 
the presence of others than alone (Smith & Mackie, 2000). Social psychologists attempt to 
explain such a phenomenon by appealing to the significance the participant placed on performing 
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in front of others, through the ideas and mental events they experienced at the time about the 
importance of giving a good impression.  
To function effectively in a social world, people naturally study and hypothesise about 
the behaviour of others (Smith & Mackie, 2000). For example, we do this to gain promotion, to 
attract romantic partners, to establish standing in the social groups to which we belong, and to 
avoid injury from others. We also use it to navigate the social world, to work back from 
behaviour to decipher what people are thinking, and  to predict how people will act in a given 
situation (Bermudez, 2005). Likewise, social psychology is also concerned with explaining 
social behaviour. Therefore, in this sense, commonsense explanations of behaviour and scientific 
social psychology are alike. The way they differ is found in the methods they use, not the goals 
they seek (Fletcher & Haig, 1989). In other words, social psychology attempts to apply scientific 
method to the observation of behaviour (commonsense psychology) in order to identify 
systematic patterns or phenomena that might be classified as scientific knowledge. 
Social science research methods are employed to establish the validity of the constructs 
and processes evident within the different disciplines concerned with the explanation of 
behaviour. Because of the nature of the content under investigation in many sub-disciplines of 
psychology, research methods used to hypothesise and validate latent constructs have been 
developed. Although far from perfect, these research methods are employed to allow the 
development and testing of worthwhile theories. Therefore, it can be argued that there currently 
exists the means of testing commonsense mentalistic explanations in an empirically based 
scientific manner. The research methods employed in psychology do warrant criticism, but 
mainly for their inappropriate use and inability to contribute to unified theory (Trierweiler & 
Stricker, 1998). Psychological theory development and testing is fragmented and lacks a 
cohesive unifying framework (Ilardi & Feldman, 2001; Trierweiler & Stricker, 1998). This is 
particularly so within clinical psychology (Westen & Bradley, 2005), whose theory and practice 
would benefit from being more closely related to advances in other psychological sub-
disciplines. A levels-of-explanation framework provides the ability to look for cohesion among 
these often disparate approaches. It has been established that commonsense explanation of 
behaviour via appeal to causally efficacious mental events is possible, useful, and can be known 
systematically and scientifically. The benefit of being able to systematically and scientifically 
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explain behaviour from the intentional stance is that ultimately, prediction of behaviour can be 
successful whether mental events are causally efficacious, and guided by causal laws, or not. 
 Given that psychology adopts a physicalist world view, what then is the relationship 
between mental causes at the commonsense level and the physical brain? 
The adoption of philosophy of mind within a levels-of-explanation framework 
There is an emerging body of evidence to support a levels-of-explanation approach to 
researching and understanding the nature of the mind and the physical brain. This approach 
assumes that relations hold between the different levels of knowledge offered by the different 
disciplines attempting to explain mind and behaviour such as neuroscience, cognitive 
psychology, and applied psychology (de Jong, 2002).  The attempt to reconcile knowledge of the 
physicality of the brain with knowledge of its processes and output is similar to giving an 
explanation of a computer-displayed video clip. To do this we need to utilise knowledge of the 
physical hardware of the computer, the algorithms and information encoding by which 
information is processed by the software, and the actual visual presentation of the video clip 
itself. Certain theoretical approaches, for example Ilardi and Feldman’s (2001) Cognitive 
Neuroscience Paradigm, have been proposed to provide unifying meta-theoretical frameworks of 
mind.  The Cognitive-Neuroscience paradigm rests on several clear premises, and provides a 
framework in which consilience (linking facts and fact-based theories across disciplines) can be 
established between the knowledge of different disciplines. Huib Looren de Jong (2002) 
describes the benefits of understanding the mind using a levels-of-explanation, giving a credible 
example of how such an approach would be structured and function. Therefore, the levels-of-
explanation approach can be considered a reasonably well established paradigm utilised to gain a 
more integrated understanding of the mind and its physicality.  
Interestingly, both Ilardi and Feldman (2001) and de Jong (2002) tend to downplay the 
importance of knowledge offered by philosophy of mind in favour of knowledge from 
philosophy of psychology or philosophy of biology, which are less concerned with metaphysical 
matters and more with consilience between different levels of the physical brain and its 
processes.  The philosophies of psychology and biology are applied by de Jong to assess 
consilience between different sub-personal levels. However, theorising about the nature of 
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mental events and their relationship to behaviour, while still grounded in empirical fact, relies 
more on theorising about the nature of mentalistic concepts, in other words, metaphysics. Ilardi 
and Feldman (2000) place little importance on the personal level of explanation, choosing 
instead to explain such phenomena via a token identity, mental state-equals-physical-state 
explanation. While this approach grounds the mental event in its physiological substrate, thus 
providing the possibility of mentalistic causation, it still does not explain what a thought is or 
illuminate the causal mechanism involved.  
The attempt to understand the mind through a levels-of-explanation paradigm facilitates 
an improvement in our understanding of mind and provides a basis for further research. 
However, current attempts fail to sufficiently include personal level, commonsense explanation 
of behaviour. Namely, while great care is taken to reinvigorate approaches to knowledge in the 
sub-personal levels, links to mentalistic events and their causal properties are not as well 
covered. As has been argued previously, such information is embedded within the theory and 
practice of clinical psychology. Establishing strong links between mental events and their 
biological substrates, in an effort to increase the validity of our knowledge of complex human 
behaviour via commonsense explanations, is essential to increasing the scientific worth of 
clinical psychological theory. Philosophy of mind is able to inform our concept of mind at the 
personal level, and should be employed in such a manner. Within a wider frame work of mind, 
philosophy of mind can be applied to increase the validity of our concept of mental events and 
their causal properties at the personal level. Theories, like the representational theory of mind, 
can provide insight into the causal properties of mental events and provide possible links with 
physical substrates through a language-like structure analogous to a thought’s lower physicality. 
Philosophy of mind needs to be woven into any levels-of-explanation frame work due to the 
insights it offers about mental events and their functioning at the level of commonsense 
explanation.  
Metaphysical theorising focuses primarily on understanding a certain class of cognitive 
states that do not occur at the lower levels-of-explanation: principally, the intentional states of 
beliefs and desires. These intentional states guide commonsense explanation of behaviour 
because they have content, and are based on representations of the world. Explanations of 
behaviour at the personal level also identify regularities of behaviour that are not reducible to the 
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lower levels-of-explanation. Such explanations, as we have seen, are essential to the profession 
of clinical psychology, but they are not without their critics. However, they seem to be currently 
widely used, provide essential information over and above purely physical explanation, and 
provide an essential, albeit flawed shortcut to understanding behaviour in a clinical setting.  
 The mind/brain problem is centred on reconciling and explaining subjectively 
experienced mental events and the physical processes on which they are based. A levels-of-
explanation framework allows for this reconciliation, while retaining the non-reducible nature of 
explanation at the different levels. The application of a levels-of-explanation framework would 
have two main benefits for the discipline of clinical psychology. It would allow for the 
reconciliation and organisation of different types of aetiological information necessarily handled 
by clinicians in every day practice. It would also allow the application of philosophy of mind to 
often used concepts of mentalistic causation at the personal level, thus improving our 
understanding of the possibility and limits of explanation at this level, while still holding a 
naturalist/physicalist view of the mental.  
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Chapter Five 
Evidence-based Practice 
Evidence-based practice 
The training and practice of clinical psychologists in New Zealand is based on the 
scientist-practitioner model (Evans, Rucklidge, & O'Driscoll, 2007). Because this model 
maintains that empirical research is centrally important, the training and practice that results is 
primarily cognitive behaviourally focused. Further, there is an assumption that certain 
procedures and principles of practice are applied by all registered clinicians as outlined in the 
Code of Ethics for Psychologists Working in New Zealand/Aotearoa (Evans, Rucklidge, & 
O'Driscoll, 2007). The code of ethics includes four overarching principles, one of which is 
“Integrity of Practice”. Under this principle, clinicians are expected to adhere to evidence-based 
practice and to integrate their practice with the body of literature available in psychology. To 
achieve this, a generic approach is adopted whereby certain assessment, case formulation, and 
treatment practices are utilized. The desired result is a uniformed standard of practice across the 
various psychological services. Because clinical practice has a cognitive behavioural foundation, 
it is directly concerned with the mind and predicting behaviour based on information about 
mental states.  
 The professional practice of clinical psychology in New Zealand is committed to 
grounding clinical practice on a base of scientific knowledge. However, this approach does not 
explicitly require attention to the inadequacies of the current knowledge base. As previously 
discussed in chapter one, empirical pursuits in psychology, and clinical psychology in particular, 
have dominated theoretical pursuits. Consequently, theoretical pursuits have not been fostered in 
the same way as empirical approaches when applying psychology to clinical settings. The 
opinion that theory and philosophy are too abstract, difficult to grasp, and largely irrelevant to 
clinical practice is often given as justification for this lack of application (Trierweiler & Stricker, 
1998). However, because of the difficulties involved in knowing the mind empirically, 
theoretical and philosophical pursuits should be strongly encouraged. If theoretical and 
philosophical pursuits within clinical psychology were encouraged clinicians would arguably be 
better equipped to adhere to their ethical obligations of integrity in practice because the 
foundational concepts on which practice is based would be better understood. 
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 Much relevant research, both theoretical and philosophical, is ignored in the discipline of 
clinical psychology. Given the argued importance of reconciling clinical knowledge with 
knowledge of the nature of mind as informed by philosophy and theoretical psychology, the 
major components of evidence-based practice and case formulation in clinical practice will be 
explored with a focus on the relevance of the philosophy of mind.  
The scientist-practitioner model and evidence-based practice 
The scientist-practitioner approach to clinical psychology is grounded in scientific 
evidence, through the application of basic scientific psychological  knowledge to clinical settings 
(Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007). Indeed, this grounding in scientific research is what distinguishes 
clinical psychology from other helping professions (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007). In accordance 
with the scientist-practitioner model, those qualifying with a postgraduate diploma or doctorate 
in clinical psychology in New Zealand must complete a research degree as part of their 
qualification. Clinicians are not only expected to be competent in the techniques of delivering a 
service; they are also expected to be able to contribute to research, and have the necessary skills 
to understand and critically appraise the current research literature. These skills guide an 
evidence-based clinical practice.  
The basis of the modern scientist-practitioner model was established at the Boulder 
Conference in 1949. At the conclusion of the conference, it was decided that clinical 
psychologists should be active researchers as well as practitioners (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007). 
The scientist-practitioner approach was initially proposed to improve on an apparent paucity of 
scientific knowledge in the clinical application of psychology. Much of clinical practice during 
the first half of the 20th century was heavily influenced by Freudian psychoanalysis, which is 
widely considered unscientific and therefore, unsuitable for application to psychological practice 
(Grunbaum, 1991). The scientist-practitioner model contrasts with the Freudian psychoanalytic 
approach, which dominated clinical psychology during the first half of the 20th century.  The 
scientist-practitioner model is grounded in clinician-instigated, empirically validated research. 
As well as being grounded in empirical research, the scientist-practitioner model also requires 
clinicians to practice in a scientific manner, conducting clinical assessment, case formulation, 
and treatment in the same way that a researcher would formulate and test hypotheses (Evans & 
Fitzgerald, 2007).  
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 To adhere to a scientist-practitioner model, clinicians must engage in evidence-based 
practice (EBP). For the past 40 years, the practice of clinical psychology has attempted evidence-
based practice in accordance with the scientist-practitioner model (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007). 
EBP is founded on the premises that: 1) patient care can be improved by the acquisition and use 
of up-to-date research information; 2) that it is difficult for a practicing clinician to keep up with 
new research in their area of practice; 3) that if they do not keep up with new research their 
practice quality will decline; and 3) that clinicians need the necessary skills to access information 
provided by experts (Chambless & Ollendick, 2001). Therefore, EBP provides a bridge between 
theory and practice because it demands clinicians base their practice on up-to-date evidence. 
However, as the knowledge base in clinical psychology has expanded, expectations that 
clinicians be actively involved in research have been reduced in favour of an increased focus on 
professional training. The reduced expectation of clinicians’ research output was recommended 
during the Vail Conference of 1974 (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007).  As a result, professional 
training in the USA now includes both the traditional combination of professional practice and 
research, as well as the doctorate in clinical psychology, which reduces the emphasis on original 
research (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2007). The tension between the practitioner as a scientifically 
minded professional, formulating and testing hypotheses, versus the practitioner as a technician, 
delivering manualised treatment as developed by academics, guides debate over how to best 
apply evidence to practice. At stake is the future direction, position, and professional credibility 
of clinical psychology as represented by professionals rather than paraprofessionals (Westen, 
Thompson-Brenner, & Novotny, 2005). 
Is evidence-based practice achieved?  
While EBP is a requirement for responsible clinical practice, a commitment to EBP 
requires more than the citing of an established precedent for a chosen approach to treatment. The 
increasing focus on empirically supported therapies (EST’s) in clinical psychology as opposed to 
EBP in general, has lead to concerns over the delivery of EBP and fears that clinical 
psychologists may become paraprofessionals. Although a significant component of EBP is the 
understanding and use of empirically supported therapies, EBP is not the same as the use of 
EST’s (Westen, Thompson-Brenner, & Novotny, 2005). While the EST literature guides 
treatment choice based on evidence of efficacy and effectiveness, EBP refers to the evidence on 
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which clinical psychology, as a whole, is based.  Indeed, developing a greater understanding of 
foundational concepts, and the causal mechanisms on which therapeutic approaches are based, is 
arguably as important to the progress of clinical psychology as establishing effective treatments. 
Empirically supported therapies are therapies classified as effective and/or efficacious 
according to certain criteria. Guidelines for what counts as empirically supported are given by 
The Task Force in Promotion and Dissemination of Psychological Procedures, Division 12 
(Clinical Psychology) of the American Psychological Association (Chambless & Ollendick, 
2001).  This task force divided therapies into three types depending on the empirical support they 
have including, well established therapies, probably efficacious therapies, and experimental 
therapies. For a treatment approach to be a ‘well established therapy’ there needs to be: 1) at 
least two between-groups trials that demonstrate the superiority of the treatment in question over 
placebo or another treatment or equivalence to already established treatments; and 2) a large 
series of single case designs demonstrating efficacy with the use of good experimental design 
and comparison with other treatments. Treatments should also be clearly explained or include 
treatment manuals, and effects should be demonstrated by at least two independent research 
groups. ‘Probably efficacious’ treatments should be substantiated by at least two experiments, 
which demonstrate superiority over wait list control groups, or a series of single case design 
studies that meet well established treatment criteria. Lastly there are ‘experimental treatments’, 
which are treatments not yet tested in trials that meet certain method requirements. These criteria 
for the establishment of EST’s are intended to ensure that therapeutic approaches used in clinical 
psychology are supported empirically in an adequate manner. 
 Recently there has been renewed debate about the deficiencies in the literature on EST’s 
and, therefore, the knowledge claims that can be made from them. (Chambless & Ollendick, 
2001; Weisz, Henggeler, & Weersing, 2005; Westen & Bradley, 2005; Westen, Thompson-
Brenner, & Novotny, 2004, 2005). This criticism is focussed largely on the limitations of the 
EST literature, and how these limitations manifest in clinical practice. For example, the use of 
meta-analyses in the EST literature has been identified as being problematic. While meta-
analyses provide a useful method by which evidence for treatment effects can be shown over a 
large number of studies, they also have weaknesses. Meta-analyses combine effect sizes from 
multiple published studies and yield an indication of the average strength of the treatment. 
Irregularities between study method, differences in outcome measurement, variations in 
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treatment delivery, differences in therapist training, use of unsuitable comparison groups, and 
publication bias, among other problems, all limit the worth of meta analyses as evidence of 
treatment effectiveness (Westen & Bradley, 2005).  
The application of nomothetic information obtained from the EST literature, 
idiographically to clinical settings, also poses problems. The evidence from EST’s is often 
reported as statistical averages, with results averaged over hundreds of participants, when in fact 
the ‘average’ person does not exist. The application of nomothetic information to individual 
clients limits the real world benefits of laboratory tested techniques. Further, EST’s are often 
efficacious in controlled settings using participants who have no comorbid psychopathology, 
while clients who receive treatment in the community often have multiple diagnoses (Westen & 
Bradley, 2005). In an effort to isolate the dependent variable (psychopathology), possible 
extraneous variables normally present in real world situations are removed, thereby sacrificing 
external for internal validity in order to improve causal inferences. These inherent weaknesses 
suggest that clinicians should not simply deliver manualised treatment packages blindly because 
a treatment approach proven efficacious in the laboratory may not be effective in clinical 
practice. Instead, when engaging in EBP, clinicians need to be aware of the limitations of the 
EST literature and adapt their practice accordingly. This is not to say that empirically validated 
approaches should not be used, but that they should be used critically. 
Although there are weaknesses in the EST literature, certain therapies, such as cognitive 
behavioural therapy, are efficacious in the treatment of psychopathology (Butler, Chapman, 
Forman, & Beck, 2006; McGinn, 2000; Roth & Fonagy, 2005). However, despite evidence for 
the therapeutic effectiveness of certain therapies, the mechanisms of change are often unclear. 
This is partly due to the inherent difficulties in gaining knowledge of latent causal mechanisms. 
It could also be argued that research into the nature of latent causal mechanisms has been 
overlooked in favour of research on treatment effects. While CBT treatments have proven 
efficacious, it is not necessarily clear why they are efficacious. For this reason, there may be 
causal variables other than the proposed treatment condition having an effect. Several alternative 
explanations have been put forward.  One such explanation is that the treatment effect is caused 
by the therapeutic rapport established between clinician and client (Dawes, 1994). That is, the 
therapeutic change is caused by the positive interaction that occurs between the clinician and 
client. Cited in favour of this explanation is the evidence that therapist experience has little effect 
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on treatment outcome, that varying results are obtained from the same treatments, and that there 
is a similarity in therapeutic change found across treatment approaches  (Dawes, 1994).  
Therefore, it is possible that despite the evidence for the efficacy of certain treatments, therapies 
may not be efficacious as a result of their proposed causes. The uncertainty over what is causing 
the modest therapeutic change evident in the EST literature suggests that greater effort should be 
applied to validating the underlying constructs and theory upon which those therapies are based. 
Another problem with the over emphasis on developing scientifically stringent, 
efficacious treatments, is that clinical psychology has become removed from the basic science of 
psychology (Westen & Bradley, 2005). Again, this is not to say that the empirical support of 
therapies is not important to establish, but that investigation into their proposed causal 
mechanisms is equally important. Experiments that show depressed people tend to have reduced 
reaction times when primed with negatively themed words (Hedlund & Rude, 1995) do not 
sufficiently describe the nature of  those mental events implicated as aetiologically important in 
cognitive theories of depression. The separation of clinical theory and practice from advances in 
the wider science of psychology is further exacerbated by the developmental origins of major 
therapeutic approaches. The majority of therapeutic approaches in clinical psychology have been 
founded on the therapeutic innovations of creative and intuitive clinicians, rather than being 
grounded in basic psychological theory (Ilardi & Feldman, 2001; Westen & Bradley, 2005). 
Further, there is a lack of application to clinical psychology of those innovations that occur in 
other related disciplines, for example, the biological sciences (Ilardi & Feldman, 2001; Westen & 
Bradley, 2005). The focus on establishing treatment effects in the EST literature has contributed 
to the current focus on efficacy rather than basic science and theory development. As a result, 
more emphasis is placed on researching whether or not CBT reduces depressive 
symptomatology, as opposed to researching evidence for the existence of depressogenic schema 
and their causal role in major depression, despite these two questions being of equal importance 
for evidence-based practice. The lack of a unifying theory in wider psychology further 
compromises the development of foundational theory in clinical psychology (Ilardi & Feldman, 
2001; Trierweiler & Stricker, 1998). Consequently, multitudinous and disparate theoretical 
perspectives are often used in attempts to understand clinically relevant phenomena (Ilardi & 
Feldman, 2001; Trierweiler & Stricker, 1998).  
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To address these problems, a greater amount of research is needed to refine the 
foundational constructs that provide a basis for therapeutic approaches. Currently, little evidence 
exists to suggest that there will be any unifying theory developed to draw together these 
disparate perspectives in psychology at large (Trierweiler & Stricker, 1998). However, with the 
development of several such frameworks within clinical psychology, for example, the cognitive 
neuro-science paradigm, promulgated by Ilardi and Feldman (2001), there may be some reason 
for optimism.  
A lack of unified theory, multitudinous theoretical perspectives, the lack of grounding in 
basic science, and the focus on EST’s in evidence-based practice, have all contributed to an 
underdeveloped understanding of the causal mechanisms in clinical psychology. Similarly, 
questions about the nature of the mind and mental events directly relate to theory development in 
clinical psychology but they are rarely considered in the clinical literature. The ethical 
guidelines, by which clinicians are bound, require that clinicians practice EBP. Therefore, to 
meet this demand, greater efforts should be given to refining constructs within the discipline of 
clinical psychology.  
The application of philosophical concepts of mind to cognitive behavioural models in clinical 
psychology 
It has been argued that inherent weaknesses exist in the way clinical psychology develops 
and refines theory. As a result, the causal mechanisms implicated in the aetiology of 
psychopathology, especially the personal level of explanation, are not as well understood as 
current knowledge in other disciplines, including psychology and the biological sciences, would 
allow. It could be argued that such a lack of understanding compromises clinicians’ ethical 
obligations to adhere to EBP. A case in point is the use of mentalistic concepts in theories of 
psychopathology without acknowledging the epistemological limits of such concepts. For 
example, the causal efficacy accorded to thoughts by CBT is rigorously denied by some 
philosophers (Churchland, 1981), and supported by others (Davidson, 1980).  The application of 
the debate about the epistemological worth of concepts imbedded in clinical psychology, 
particularly those about latent causal mechanisms, would help theory development. Primarily, it 
would allow for the defence and development of those concepts central to much of the theory in 
clinical psychology. This would be possible, by adopting a levels-of-explanation approach, 
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which would allow the application of philosophy of mind to help explain phenomena in clinical 
psychology, particularly personal level explanation, and inter level relations. To outline how this 
might be accomplished, proposed causal mechanisms and empirical evidence for the cognitive 
models of psychopathology need to be applied across explanatory levels. 
 A levels-of-explanation approach to understanding the mind can incorporate cognitive 
models of depression for the purpose of refining concepts and theory. This can be done by 
considering current ways of conceptualising causal mechanisms as well as the evidence 
accumulated to support them and applying this evidence across explanatory levels.  As discussed 
in chapter two, CBT is based on the premises that ones thoughts are causally related to ones 
feelings and behaviour. Furthermore, these thoughts can be monitored, challenged, and changed, 
causing a reduction in pathological symptoms (J. Beck, 1995). Beck’s Cognitive Theory of 
Depression states that non endogenous depression is the result of the activation of negative self 
schema. Schemas are described as organised representations of ones prior experiences. When 
activated by life stressors, depressive schemas heavily influence both the content and process of 
ones thoughts. Affected thought content is manifested primarily in negative beliefs about the 
world, the self, and the future (the Cognitive Triad). Thought processes are primarily affected by 
distortions in the biased focus on, and interpretation of, information from the environment 
(Ingram, Scott, & Siegel, 1999).  Cognitive aetiological models of depression are considered to 
be well established through a broad base of research (Ingram, Scott, & Siegel, 1999).  
Empirical evidence of affected thought content via depressive schema activation, 
demonstrates that depressed people report more negative and less positive automatic self referent 
thinking than controls (Ingram, Slater, Atkinson, & Scott, 1990), as well as a greater tendency to 
evaluate other stimuli negatively (Hokanson, Hummer, & Butler, 1991; Siegel & Alloy, 1990). 
Indeed, the evidence for the existence of the negative Cognitive Triad is extensive and regarded 
as a central aspect of depression (Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991). Evidence for the presence of 
dysfunctional information processing in depressed individuals has also been well established 
(Ingram, Scott, & Siegel, 1999). Depressed people have been shown to display a biased direction 
of attention to internal rather than external information (Ingram, Slater, Atkinson, & Scott, 
1990), to selectively encode negative information, and to recall more negative information than 
controls (Ingram, Scott, & Siegel, 1999). From this body of evidence it is reasoned there exist 
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latent cognitive schemas which act as causal mechanisms in the development of depression 
(Ingram, Scott, & Siegel, 1999).  
Empirical evidence for the existence of schemas is primarily based on priming research 
paradigms. For example, Hedlund and Rude (1995) used a self-focusing procedure to show that 
currently and previously depressed people recalled more negative adjectives and constructed 
more negative sentences in a scrambled sentence task than those who had not been depressed. 
Priming paradigms are considered to support the presence of latent causal schemas by 
demonstrating that currently or previously depressed people show priming effects for negative 
information content when controls do not. The presence of priming effects suggests that the 
cognitive deficits, which are a well documented symptom of depression, are not just a symptom 
expression of the disorder, but are also indicative of a latent causal mechanism (Ingram, Scott, & 
Siegel, 1999).  
The aforementioned research is part of the majority of evidence which supports 
aetiological cognitive approaches to psychopathology. In order to describe the causal 
mechanisms an inferential step is often made from the accumulated evidence cited (Ingram, 
Scott, & Siegel, 1999). A great deal of empirical evidence is focussed on the product of the 
inferred latent causal mechanisms, but little research is undertaken in order to describe the 
mechanisms themselves (Wenzel & Rubin, 2005). While evidence of the product of causal 
mechanisms is important, it is arguably not sufficient to meet the ethical obligations of EBP. Can 
a schema be understood only in terms of its function and effect on behaviour and mood via 
thinking process? What is the nature of a schema? Are we able to know schemas ontologically as 
they exist?  How are cognitive processes and schemas mapped onto brain structures, considering 
that psychology is committed to a naturalist world view? How are mentalistic concepts, which 
are central to CBT, related to these schemas? While it is arguably impossible to answer these 
questions empirically, simply acknowledging these problems may engender a greater 
understanding of this complex area. Further, content from associated disciplines, for example, 
neurophysiology and philosophy of mind, could be drawn on, via a levels-of-explanation 
approach to increase our understanding of these latent causal mechanisms and thereby increase 
our understanding of the pathological processes in depression. 
      The application of a levels-of-explanation framework allows for the integration of 
information from different disciplines. Evidence for the aetiological influence of negative 
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schemas on the development of depression is located primarily within the sub-personal, 
algorithmic level of brain process. The cognitive processes and content that become 
dysfunctional in depression are assumed to be psychological processes working via cognitive 
affective networks, and which function at sub-personal levels of mind. These networks are made 
up of primitive emotion nodes which are linked both to the mechanisms of emotional 
physiological response and cognitive-associative networks. When activated by environmental 
stressors, spreading activation renders negative information within associated networks more 
accessible, accounting for priming effects and cognitive distortions. The subjective experience of 
sadness triggers and maintains this self perpetuating cycle (Ingram, Scott, & Siegel, 1999). 
However, other aetiological factors, occurring at lower sub-personal and personal levels-of-
explanation, are also implicated in the development of depression. As well as cognitive 
processes, microbiological, neurotransmitter functioning and personal level mentalistic 
aetiological factors are all implicated in the development of depression (Arean & Chatav, 2003). 
A levels-of-explanation approach could provide a framework within which these disparate types 
of information can be reconciled and inter level relations explored. It could be argued that this 
integration is achieved with bio-psycho-social models. However, such models simply 
acknowledge that there are different areas of aetiological information, or they attempt to link 
information already at hand, rather than systematise a uniform approach that takes into account 
the relevant methodological and epistemological issues. 
The evidence supporting cognitive contributions to the development of depression has 
primarily been concerned with unconscious information processing. However, subjectively 
experienced mental events are central to a cognitive conceptualisation of depression, and cannot 
be wholly captured within sub-personal levels. Mental events occur at the personal level of 
explanation and our knowledge of them is different and not known in the same way as with 
information processing.  
It is evident from the assumptions made by cognitive models of depression that 
information from both personal (mental events) and lower levels-of-explanation (unconscious 
information processing) are necessary in explaining depressive phenomena. In a levels-of-
explanation approach, mental events at the personal level and their causal relationships with 
behaviour and emotion can be assessed utilising philosophy of mind. Subjectively experienced 
‘depressogenic’ mental events can be correlated with the presence of depression, and can be 
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linked to overall emotional and behavioural patterns present in those who experience such 
thoughts. These subjective mental events, which are characterised by their qualia in meaningful 
explanation, can be linked to the underlying unconscious cognitive processes, providing a largely 
untapped area of investigation. The subjective experience of the thought, “I couldn’t even clean 
the house today, I’m completely useless,” could be regarded as the experienced consequent of a 
perceptual bias toward negative information in the environment. When conceptualised as part of 
the same phenomena, occurring at different non reducible explanatory levels, a more complete 
and organised explanation of the phenomena could be achieved. In this way, claims about the 
causal properties of thoughts can be linked to a physiological substrate, while keeping 
explanation within the natural world. At the same time, and as noted in the previous chapter, the 
manifestation of the phenomena at the personal level (the mental event) can be assessed via the 
rules and knowledge that hold at that level. Personal level explanation involves normative, 
meaningful explanation as opposed to being mainly descriptive. Prediction by appeal to personal 
level mentalistic concepts is also more problematic than at sub-personal levels because it relies 
on predicting behaviour on the basis of the assumed intention of the intelligent agent. The types 
of explanation relevant to different levels-of-explanation could be applied in order to critique and 
therefore strengthen theory. The desired result would be a unified understanding of 
psychopathology that utilises current knowledge within and between different explanatory levels. 
 The application of a levels-of-explanation framework to the investigation of cognitive 
models of depression would allow the examination of evidence for cognitive models present at 
personal and sub-personal levels. As previously stated, mentalistic concepts operating at the 
personal level are central to CBT models of depression. Assessment of explanatory processes 
within the personal level allows for critical examination of causal cognitive models within the 
confines of personal level explanation. Explanatory theorising at the personal level is undertaken 
in the discipline of philosophy of mind, while aetiological models in clinical psychology often 
use, but have a poor understanding of, the limits of explanation in terms of mentalistic concepts. 
By critiquing mentalistic concepts in psychology using the philosophy of mind to establish as 
close an approximation of the true nature of such mental events as possible, clinical psychology 
will be strengthened.  
Foundational constructs in clinical psychology could be refined by comparing supporting 
and contrary positions found within philosophy of mind. The philosophies of mind discussed in 
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chapter three were found to be either generally commensurable with, or incompatible with, 
concepts in clinical psychology. Those that were commensurable can be used to justify and 
refine foundational constructs in clinical psychology. Those that were not outline criticisms that 
clinical psychology must refute. When critiquing cognitive models of depression in this fashion, 
dualist explanations are ruled out. Eliminativist or strong reductive explanations deny the 
relevance of mental events in the explanation of behaviour, but are still useful because 
conceptions of causal mental events can be strengthened by the development of philosophical 
arguments in their defence. While the eliminativist theory of mind would not necessarily deny 
the existence of subjective experience, the premise that all mentalistic phenomena can only be 
described by the laws and language of the lowest explanatory level rules out the kind of 
explanation appealed to in cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology. Similarly, radical 
behaviourist theory argues for the irrelevance of mentalistic concepts, instead appealing only to 
behaviour as the appropriate unit of analysis. These two theoretical positions, as outlined in 
chapter three, pose a challenge for mentalistic explanations at the personal level. In order to 
overcome this direct challenge, it must be shown that explanation by appeal to mental events is 
possible, and that such explanations provide a benefit, over and above reductive physical 
explanations. While retaining the importance of explanation at the personal level is essential for 
causal concepts in clinical psychology in order to construct sound scientific theory, the linking of 
personal level causally efficacious phenomena to their physical substrates is preferable.  
From the perspective of a functionalist theory of mind, mental events are characterised in 
terms of the cognitive processes at the sub-personal level, rather than by the nature of their 
content. While the functionalist theory of mind does allow for the existence of personal level 
explanation as a result of causally efficacious mental events, it does not describe how these 
mental events are causally efficacious as a result of their content. Therefore, while a functionalist 
theory of mind would prove useful in justifying the causal efficacy of mental events, the link 
between mental event and the physiology of the brain, which is at the heart of the mind/brain 
problem, is not addressed in a substantive manner.  Rather, the link is described by appealing to 
abstract functional properties.  
Autonomous mind theories allow for the existence of causal mental events because they 
maintain the autonomy of personal level explanations. However, while the identity theory holds 
that the causal laws that govern the physical substrate would also govern the mental event, the 
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representational theory of mind gives an explanation of how mental events can be causally 
efficacious by appeal to the content of mental events themselves. In the representational theory 
of mind, the content of the propositional attitude, plus the vehicle of this content (an isomporphic 
physiological structure), is conceptualised as similar to the semantics and syntax of a sentence. 
This conceptualisation allows for the explanation of the cognitive model of depression across 
explanatory levels. At the personal level, the content of the depressogenic thought can be 
explained via current knowledge of personal level explanations. For example, experiencing the 
thought, “He did not seem excited that I passed my test, therefore, it must not be an achievement, 
and I must be a failure,” is considered to have a causal effect on mood and behaviour in CBT 
theory. The content refers to the subjective experience or qualia of the thoughts and beliefs 
which cause depression. This aspect of depression can be explained in a meaningful manner at 
the personal level, though it is not possible at lower levels-of-explanation. The personal level of 
explanation can then be linked to lower level processes, in order to ground personal explanation 
in the physiology of the brain. In a representational theory of mind the content of the thought of 
being a failure is “I’m a failure” and contains the concepts of self and failure. The content of the 
propositional attitude or belief is ‘carried’ by the syntax-like vehicle, which possess a physicality 
that allows it to function at the sub-personal levels.  Lower levels-of-explanation look to 
physiological substrates and unconscious processes at the algorithmic level as described in terms 
of their processes and physical nature. Therefore, while explanation at the personal level 
examines and describes content driven, subjectively experienced, mental events, the vehicle of 
this content functions at, and reconciles personal level explanation with, lower levels. This level 
of explanation encompasses the majority of the evidence given previously in this chapter for 
cognitive models of depression. Finally, at the lower levels-of-explanation, the physiology of the 
cognitive processes evident at the algorithmic level, is explored. The vehicle of the content of the 
propositional attitude is a likely area for exploring the interrelationships between brain processes 
and physiology. The representational mind, applied to cognitive behaviourally based concepts of 
mentalistic causation, allows for the autonomy of mental causation, explains how they are linked 
to the physicality of the brain, and can account for the importance of the qualia of subjectively 
experienced mental events. In doing so, the representational theory of mind is commensurable 
with the evolutionary account of mind as outlined in chapter four. The two are commensurable 
because the representational theory of mind accounts for the importance that subjectively 
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experienced visual representations of an increasingly complex world, had in the evolution of the 
modern mind 
This account of how the philosophy of mind, the representational theory of mind in 
particular, can be applied to psychological concepts through the application of a levels-of-
explanation framework, is a hypothetical example which demonstrates the possibility of using 
this approach to assess and refine the value of cognitive aetiological models within clinical 
psychology. Further, the example allows for the application of philosophy of mind to concepts of 
mind and brain within clinical psychology, primarily for the justification of the use of causal 
mentalistic concepts at the personal level in aetiological models of psychopathology.  
Conclusion 
Clinical psychologists are ethically bound to adhere to evidence-based-practice. To 
achieve this, clinicians must ensure that their practice is grounded in up-to-date knowledge of 
theory and practice in clinical and general psychology. There have been valid criticisms of the 
understanding of what constitutes evidence-based practice, – primarily that too much emphasis is 
placed on EST’s. This heavy focus on ESTs has resulted in treatment effectiveness/efficacy 
being emphasised over construct development in clinical psychology. This overemphasis is 
further exacerbated by the development of clinical therapy being based more on intuition than 
theory as well as the separation of clinical psychology from wider psychology.  In order to 
strengthen and refine theoretical constructs within clinical psychology, philosophical concepts of 
mind can be applied. Philosophy of mind is concerned with how mental events are related to the 
physiology of the brain, and whether or not mental events can be causally related to behaviour 
and mood. While much theory and practice in clinical psychology is concerned with similar 
content to the philosophy of mind, the nature and function of mentalistic concepts are neither as 
well understood nor as well explored in clinical psychology. The application of philosophical 
concepts of mind to theory in clinical psychology is possible by using a levels-of-explanation 
framework. It would improve theory construction and allow clinical psychologists to meet their 
obligation to carry out EBP.     
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Chapter Six 
Psychological Case Formulation  
What is case formulation? 
Psychological case formulation is the process of hypothesising and identifying the causal 
factors that contribute to an individual’s current difficulties. It is central to the discipline of 
clinical psychology (Persons & Tompkins, 2007). Case formulation involves the gathering and 
reviewing all relevant clinical information, comparing this information with knowledge from the 
relevant research literature and finally working it into a coherent story as to why a particular 
person has particular problems at a given time. The information gathered for the purpose of 
formulation usually includes particulars about the client which have predisposed, precipitated, 
maintained, and protected against the development of the client’s current difficulties. Without 
being formulated as a case, this information would merely form a list of disparate facts with little 
utility (Persons & Tompkins, 2007). Case formulation is concerned with establishing the 
presence of causal mechanisms, and therefore informs treatment. 
  Case formulation is a systematic process which rests upon the gathering of data 
pertaining to a person’s current life situation. The relevant information collected during 
assessment, also referred to as data, should be gathered from multiple sources in a systematic 
manner in order to increase the reliability of the case formulation (Vertue & Haig, 2008). The 
main source of information is the unstructured clinical interview in which the clinician guides 
and records a discussion about the client’s current difficulties, presence of symptoms, relevant 
background information, competencies and weaknesses, and other pertinent information. 
Information is also gathered from standardised psychometric instruments including intelligence 
tests, personality inventories, and objective measurements of symptomatology.  
 The formulating clinician integrates the information gathered during the assessment 
phase and attempts to identify the presence of pathology from which to infer underlying causal 
mechanisms. For example, a client may report significant depressive symptomatology, and also 
score highly on the Beck Depression Inventory (A. Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). This 
demonstrates a pattern whereby the client’s personal explanation of their symptoms is consistent 
with their score on an objective measure. Both verbal report and standardised measure 
69 
 
information, which form the symptom pattern, are informed by an accumulated body of 
literature. Therefore, the case formulation is the interface between the literature and the 
application of that knowledge idiographically in order to gain an understanding of the individual. 
An initial case formulation will indicate appropriate treatment approaches, and allow for the 
treatment approach to be tailored to the individual client. During the treatment phase, causal 
hypotheses that were made during the case formulation should be revised in light of any new 
evidence (Eells, 2007). In this respect, case formulation is an organic process, interwoven 
throughout the entire clinical process. 
The distinction between reasoning and formulation  
An important distinction needs to be made before discussing the application of 
philosophically informed concepts of mind to the case formulation process – the distinction 
between clinical reasoning and formulation. Clinical reasoning can be understood as the 
reasoning processes involved in describing health problems, whereas case formulation can be 
understood as the integration of the description of health problems with an explanation of those 
problems in terms of causal mechanisms (Vertue & Haig, 2008). To clarify this point, consider 
the question “What is depression?” in light of both the concepts of clinical reasoning and case 
formulation. Firstly, consider clinical reasoning as the process of descriptive reasoning whereby 
a clinician arrives at a diagnosis. Given that current DSM-IV-TR diagnoses are qualitatively 
differentiated from normal functioning, and are therefore conceptualised as symptom clusters 
with no implied aetiological markers, the reasoning process involves matching the client’s 
presentation with a symptom list. Therefore, the truth value of the description is high; the 
symptoms described in the diagnostic criteria are either present or absent. If the client’s 
symptomatology meets the diagnostic criteria, then by definition, they have the disorder. For 
example, in the diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, if the client exhibits the cognitive 
symptoms of feeling worthless and suicidal ideation (plus other criteria sufficient to warrant 
diagnosis), then those criteria constitute depression. Contrast this with the case formulation 
process. The question “What is depression?” in the context of case formulation refers to more 
than diagnostic criteria; it refers to underlying causes. Whereas the manifestation of depression is 
considered in the clinical reasoning process, the cause and its relationship to behavioural, 
cognitive, and physiological manifestations are considered in case formulation. Therefore, case 
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formulation is fundamental to clinical psychology because it includes causal hypotheses for 
aetiologically neutral mental disorder diagnoses, and therefore, explanation of psychological 
dysfunctional. This allows for a more complete understanding of psychopathology and identifies 
areas for therapeutic intervention.  
Vertue and Haig (2008) elaborate on the distinction between clinical reasoning and 
clinical formulation by contrasting diagnosis in clinical psychology with diagnosis in medicine. 
In medicine, like clinical psychology, a diagnosis is warranted when a particular pattern of 
symptoms is present. However, in medicine, assumptions about causal mechanisms are linked 
strongly to diagnoses, and are relatively certain. In clinical psychology there is ‘pervasive 
uncertainty about causal mechanisms’, which are complex and multifaceted (Vertue & Haig, 
2008, p. 7). In this way, the case formulation process allows for hypothesising about causal 
mechanisms, and therefore, unlike diagnosis, explains the client’s current problems. For this 
reason, case formulation is more important than reasoning to diagnosis for the purposes of 
explaining phenomena and informing treatment in clinical psychology. Given the complexity and 
uncertainty of causal mechanisms in clinical psychology, the value of the hypothesised causal 
mechanisms underlying pathological presentations will depend on the quality of the process or 
methods by which the clinician carries out the case formulation. Certain biases have been 
identified as hindering the case formulation process and several systematic approaches have been 
proposed in order to overcome these biases.           
Conceptual issues and biases in case formulation and clinical reasoning    
Errors and biases in case formulation and clinical reasoning have been well documented. 
Due to the varied and different case formulation approaches, the large breadth of information 
handled, the constraints on time and human fallibility, a case formulation can appear to be at 
times haphazard, unsystematic, and biased by errors of reasoning (Dumont, 1993; Dumont & 
Lecomte, 1987; Eells, 2007; MacDonald, 1996; Nezu, Nezu, Peacock, & Girdwood, 2004). In 
this respect, the process of case formulation is similar to the pursuit for knowledge.  
Assumptions based on personal beliefs or prior experience are not the same as knowledge claims 
based on systematic and method based scientific inquiry. Similar to scientific inquiry, the case 
formulation process should be governed by the epistemological principles central to gaining 
knowledge of natural phenomena. This is done through the application of appropriate methods 
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when undertaking scientific inquiry. Case formulation is no different in this respect. Due to the 
importance of producing reliable formulations that are as close a representation of reality as 
possible, biases of the case formulation process and reasoning must be addressed through the 
application of appropriate methods.  
Some of the relevant issues to consider when conducting a case formulation are now 
outlined. Firstly, there is a tension between delivering a case formulation that is simple enough to 
be useful but that can also convey the complexity common to human experience (Eells, 2007). 
Theory is improved when achieving parsimony; in other words, the simpler the explanation for 
the range of phenomena, the greater the worth of the explanation. Another inherent tension 
within the formulation process that is mirrored in the wider search for knowledge is between 
observation and inference (Eells, 2007). Although case formulation should be based on 
observable data, causal mechanisms are often latent and need to be inferred. Therefore, although 
clinicians should not limit themselves to description, they should invoke latent causal 
mechanisms with a caution that is based on their epistemic limitations in explaining pathological 
presentations. Lastly, there is a tension when balancing information on the individual with 
nomothetic information from the research literature (Eells, 2007). By including too much 
idiographic theorising, the case formulation may not be suitably grounded in the literature. On 
the other hand, too much nomothetic theorising and the treatment approach will fail to address 
the client’s particular presentation. Considering these common pitfalls, the process of case 
formulation involves finding a balance between competing obligations. The process of case 
formulation should be undertaken in a systematic and thorough manner to overcome these 
difficulties.  
The process of clinical formulation needs to be monitored, as does the way in which the 
clinician reasons or thinks about a particular case. As noted above, human reasoning is prone to 
errors. Therefore, clinicians need to be aware of and avoid the reasoning biases common to the 
case formulation process. There are well documented errors in clinician reasoning and judgement 
in case formulation (Nezu, Nezu, Peacock, & Girdwood, 2004). Common reasoning biases 
include relying too much on easily available evidence, focussing on the information first at hand, 
not considering base rates especially when conditions are rare, being over eager to diagnose the 
‘en vogue’ disorder, adjusting information to confirm an initial diagnosis, not giving enough 
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weight to situational factors compared with intrapersonal factors, jumping to conclusions, and 
inferring a causal relationship merely from temporal sequence. These well documented biases 
highlight the increasing need for a systematic approach to case formulation  (Nezu, Nezu, 
Peacock, & Girdwood, 2004; Vertue & Haig, 2008).  
Different approaches to case formulation 
 Although it is possible to describe a generic case formulation process, there is no 
standard approach to case formulation. A case formulation is often influenced by the theoretical 
approach favoured by the clinician. Psychodynamic case formulation focuses on unconscious 
processes, whereas behavioural case formulation focuses on observable, objectively measured 
patterns of behaviour. Cognitive behavioural formulation appeals both to behavioural 
manifestations and subjective experience (Eells, 2007).  Each of these approaches focuses on the 
proposed causal mechanisms favoured by the particular theoretical approach. Just as each 
formulating clinician’s theoretical approach to practice influences the case formulation process, 
so does their beliefs on how to conceptualise and classify psychopathology. Some of the 
overarching issues that influence case formulation are whether psychopathology is viewed as 
being defined by its aetiology, or description of symptom clusters; whether psychopathological 
states are considered qualitatively or quantitatively different from non-disordered states; and, 
how one regards abnormality (Eells, 2007).        
The cognitive behavioural case formulation approach 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, there are different approaches to case 
formulation, many of which are based on different theoretical approaches to psychotherapy. The 
cognitive behavioural approach to case formulation is prominent because a large body of 
evidence supports its efficacy. The focus and direction of the cognitive behavioural formulation 
is influenced by cognitive behavioural theory. In this respect, the client’s problems are 
understood in terms of a cognitive conceptualisation  (J. Beck, 1995). Within the cognitive 
conceptualisation of case formulation, particular importance is given to the thoughts and beliefs 
associated with the client’s identified problems. While the cognitive conceptualisation is 
primarily derived from the work of Aaron Beck (see J. Beck, 1995), other important concepts 
from cognitive and behavioural theorists are included in cognitive-behavioural case 
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formulations, for example, Seligman’s theory of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975). Despite 
the range of cognitive theories, the basic premises stay the same – namely that subjectively 
experienced dysfunctional cognitions and cognitive processes give rise to psychopathology.     
The use and limits of mental events in explanation of phenomena is of central concern to 
this thesis. To illustrate the way the cognitive behavioural case formulation relies on the use of 
mentalistic concepts, an example from Persons and Tompkins (2007) will be used. This example 
includes the hypothetical case study of ‘John’. Persons and Tompkins (2007) include 7 steps in 
their model of a case formulation, including: 1)  obtaining a comprehensive problem list; 2) 
assigning a five axis DSM diagnosis; 3) selecting an anchoring diagnosis; 4) selecting a 
nomothetic formulation of the anchoring diagnosis to use as a template for the hypothesised 
psychological mechanisms that are part of the formulation; (5) individualising the template so 
that the formulation accounts for the details of the case at hand, for all the problems on the 
problem list and their relationships; (6) proposing hypotheses about the origins of the 
psychological mechanisms; and, (7) describing precipitants of the current episode of illness or 
symptom exacerbation. The problem list will include any problems identified, usually during the 
interview, and includes not only possible psychopathology but any emotional, personal, 
environmental, social, financial, and legal problems. Problems can also be identified through 
structured measures. In their case example, Parsons and Tompkins (2007) identify a number of 
problems that are affecting John’s life (step 1). These include suicidal ideation, hepatitis C, poor 
medical adherence, depressive symptoms, social anxiety and isolation, alcohol abuse, and 
unassertive behaviour. John is then assigned the following DSM diagnoses (step 2): 
Axis I  Social anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, 
alcohol abuse  
Axis II  Avoidant personality disorder 
Axis III  Hepatitis C 
Axis IV  Inadequate social support, financial difficulties 
Axis V  45 (global assessment of functioning (0-100)) 
 
The anchoring diagnosis is considered to be social anxiety disorder, of a generalised type, 
indicating that the clinician considers John’s anxiety to be of primary importance and causally 
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related to his other problems (step 3). In step four, the clinician appeals to the research literature 
in order to gather nomothetic information. This literature indicates that social anxiety results 
from the interplay of an individual’s biological and psychological vulnerabilities triggered by 
social, familial, cultural, and biological stressors. Theory on the cognitive causes of social 
anxiety, as evidenced in the accumulated literature, leads the clinician to identify similar 
occurrences in John’s presentation. When the nomothetic formulation has been individualised, 
hypotheses can be proposed about causal mechanisms. The assignment of causal mechanisms is 
the central component of the formulation process because the citing of causal mechanisms 
provides an explanation of the client’s problems (Vertue & Haig, 2007), and determines the 
approach to treatment. The effect of the assigned treatment is therefore dependent on the validity 
of the hypotheses about the causal mechanism.  
In their case example, Persons and Tompkins (2007) identify the following as the causal 
cognitive aspects of John’s problems (step 5): cognitive schemas, for example, “I’m a loser, 
whiner, geek, wimp, helpless,” “others are critical and rejecting,” “the world is bleak,” and “the 
future is uncontrollable and hopeless”; conditional assumptions, for example, “If I ask for what I 
want, people will put me down”; and automatic thoughts that lead to unassertive behaviour and 
suicidal urges. Therefore, it is argued that John’s schemas, conditional assumptions, and 
automatic thoughts cause his social anxiety disorder. The next step (step 6) in the cognitive 
behavioural case formulation process is to hypothesise about the origins of the mechanisms. In 
their case formulation about John, Persons and Tompkins (2007) cite the following origins of the 
aforementioned causal mechanisms: a biological vulnerability to anxiety from his mother; a 
developmental/environmental vulnerability regarding his lack of examples of normal social 
interaction; and, an often absent and overly critical father.   
In this case example, specific cognitive aetiological factors have been inferred and their 
origins hypothesised. However, given the previously stated limits on personal level explanation, 
certain questions are raised about the utility and application of such concepts. Obviously John 
displayed, at some stage of the assessment, thoughts congruent with the negative cognitive triad. 
He also described a childhood, which could intuitively lead to the types of presenting problems 
he now displays. However, is the physiology and ontological nature of a schema, or causal 
thought, known to the extent that we would cite them as important aetiological factors? This is 
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not to question whether schemas, or causal thoughts exist; rather, it is to ask about the extent to 
which we know them, and how our limited understanding of them affects their utility in the case 
formulation process. Specifically, when John’s causal mechanisms are inferred, with what degree 
of confidence can we say that: 1) schemas exist in the way conceptualised by CBT theory; 2) 
John has developed certain schemas about his worthlessness, the hopelessness of the future, and 
the guaranteed derision from others; 3) these schemas give rise to automatic thoughts, which 
have a causal effect on his day to day mood and behaviour; and, 4) these schema developed as a 
direct result of his mother’s social isolation and his father’s critical nature and continued 
absence? Or more fundamentally, do we even consider these questions when formulating the 
case? It has been argued in this thesis that within clinical psychology these important questions 
are not asked, and furthermore, that little effort is expended in their answering, despite the 
available means. 
The discussion so far has been centred on cognitive behavioural case formulation and the 
importance of the case formulation in uncovering causal mechanisms. It has been claimed that 
the understanding of causal mechanisms in psychological explanation is more complex and 
difficult to know than in medicine. It has also been argued, in the previous chapter, that cognitive 
behavioural case formulations rely on concepts of causal mechanisms which have been inferred 
from their effects, for example, the existence of schemas is assumed from the presence of 
negative priming phenomena. Because of the complexity of, and lack of knowledge about, the 
nature of latent causal mechanisms in clinical psychology, reasonable doubt is raised about their 
uncritical use in case formulation. However, the intention is not to argue against the use of 
cognitive concepts in the formulation of aetiological causes of psychopathology. Indeed, in the 
previous two chapters, the possible causal efficacy of mental events has been argued for. 
Therefore, it is suggested that clinicians should be aware of, and influenced by, the particular 
limits of using mentalistic concepts in psychological case formulation.  
The position of cognitive causality 
 It was argued in previous chapters that mentalistic concepts, such as thoughts, beliefs and 
propositional attitudes, are often referred to in theories in clinical psychology, but that they are 
not well researched or understood. Although there is evidence in support of the effectiveness of 
CBT (J. Beck, 1995; Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006; Chambless & Ollendick, 2001; 
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Dobson, 1988; Roth & Fonagy, 2005), most of this evidence does not address the proposed latent 
mechanisms (Wenzel & Rubin, 2005). Possible reasons for the lack of understanding of 
cognitive causal mechanism were also outlined in the previous chapter. They included the over 
emphasis on treatment effectiveness research, the separation of applied clinical theory from basic 
science, treatments being founded on clinician intuition rather than theory, and the fragmented 
nature of psychological disciplines. This lack of knowledge of foundational constructs may 
impede a clinician’s ability to meet the obligation of undertaking evidence-based practice. It was 
also argued in the previous chapter, that due to the lack of understanding of foundational 
concepts in CBT, treatment effects may not be due to the effects of the proposed causal 
mechanisms but to other variables, such as the clinician-client relationship. The lack of 
understanding of cognitive latent causal mechanisms has a direct implication for case 
formulation and clinical reasoning within clinical psychology. One of the most important aspects 
of the case formulation is the explanation of clients’ problems by appealing to latent causal 
mechanisms. Therefore, the reliability of the case formulation and subsequent treatment relies on 
the validity of the construct about the causal mechanism cited. Within the cognitive behavioural 
case formulation, predominant causal mechanisms are schemas and causally efficacious thoughts 
and beliefs.  
 It has been argued that explanation through appeal to cognitive causal mechanisms has its 
limitations. It has also been argued in chapter four that subjectively experienced, meaningful, and 
causally efficacious, mental events are important in the explanation of pathological 
presentations. Indeed, the limits of purely physical explanations, including the failure to capture 
the qualia of mental events, highlights the importance of personal level explanations. While the 
autonomy of personal level explanations is retained, as explained in chapter four, prediction at 
this level is less certain and more prone to error than physically based prediction because it is 
based on intentionality.        
Given that appeal to mentalistic concepts is necessary in clinical case formulation, how 
can the handling of cognitive concepts be refined in order to make more reliable causal claims? It 
is proposed that this can be done two ways. Firstly, it is important to control the significant 
uncertainty and complexity of explanation in case formulation. The methodological requirements 
of case formulation can be met using an appropriate systematised case formulation process, such 
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as the abductive account of case formulation (Vertue & Haig, 2008). Secondly, refinement can 
be approved by gaining and fostering a greater understanding of mentalistic concepts, their 
properties and function, their causal efficacy, and the limits of using them as the basis of 
explanation in case formulation. As previously stated, there are reasonable grounds to suggest 
that mental events can be causally efficacious, but the nature of mentalistic events needs to be 
understood in greater depth when using them in the kind of personal level explanation, which 
occurs in clinical psychology. The foundations for meeting this proposition were laid in the 
previous two chapters. There it was suggested that the understanding of mind and personal level 
explanation via mental events is improved when the relevant subject content from philosophy of 
mind is considered. Although less empirically known, metaphysical theorising can be grounded 
in empirical knowledge (Bermudez, 2005) and allow for a greater understanding of personal 
level phenomena. Further, the commitment to keep explanation within the natural world is 
satisfied by the application of the conceptual levels-of-explanation framework. This occurs 
because such a framework allows for inter-level relationships to be explored, and therefore, 
allows links to be made between the observed phenomena such as depressogenic thoughts, and 
their proposed causes, such as schemas via the cognitive processes that carry them. It also 
provides a more complete conceptualisation of personal level phenomena often cited in cognitive 
causal models, and it allows for an explanation of the phenomena as opposed to simply 
describing them. In this way, the understanding of mental events as proposed by cognitive theory 
can be improved, as can the application of such ideas in the process of case formulation. As 
argued in chapter four, clinical psychology deals with a range of information, which varies in 
epistemological worth. The confidence with which we can assume a causal relationship between 
a mechanism and its consequents depends on a number of methodological issues. For example, a 
possible causal relationship between two variables established by conducting a double blind 
randomised controlled trial is more certain than the claim made on the basis of a correlational 
research design. Similarly, causal mechanisms in medicine are often better known than in 
clinical psychology (Vertue & Haig, 2008). Clinical psychology deals with a myriad of causal 
mechanisms, which are known with differing degrees of epistemological confidence. Therefore, 
in the formulation process, the explanatory worth of differing causal mechanisms, as established 
in general research settings, needs to be taken into account when the mechanism is applied 
idiographically. The epistemological confidence granted to causal mechanisms could be included 
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in the case formulation process if the clinician assigned an ‘explanatory strength’ to each causal 
mechanism, either formally or informally. Targeting more epistemologically sound causal 
mechanisms is likely to improve treatment effects. 
 The idea of applying explanatory strength to causal mechanisms has been proposed by 
Haynes and Williams (2001), using their Functional Analytic Clinical Case Model method of 
formulation. In the Functional Analytic Clinical Case Model, each causal mechanism is assigned 
a different strength in order to guide treatment. As stated by Haynes and Williams (2001), the 
relative magnitude of effect of the mechanism is  determined by a number of clinician-estimated 
values including: 1) the estimated importance of the behaviour problems and their sequelae; 2) 
the causal relations among behaviour problems; 3) the estimated strength of relations between 
causal variables and behavioural problems, and between causal variables; 4) the estimated 
modifiability of the causal variables; 5) the presence of multiple causal paths; and, 6) the 
existence of moderator variables. These factors are all taken into account to assign a relative 
magnitude of effect to each causal mechanism. An assessment of the causal strength of a 
proposed mechanism based on the epistemological understanding, and explanatory limitations of 
that mechanism would fit naturally within this relative-magnitude-of-effect approach. In this 
way, an allowance is made for the limitations of personal level explanations, outlined in chapters 
three and four, to be factored into the case formulation process. For example, consider again the 
case of John. The identified avoidance behaviours displayed by John arguably have a stronger 
causal link to anxiety than do the negative automatic thoughts he displayed. This is because 
observable behaviours are easier to conceptualise, to measure, and to know in a comprehensive 
manner than are negative automatic thoughts. Indeed, treatment for social anxiety normally 
includes exposure, and the treatment literature has struggled to demonstrate any additional 
benefit of adding a cognitive component to treatment (Roth & Fonagy, 2005). Therefore, the 
behavioural cause in this case can be seen as having a stronger link to the pathological 
presentation than the cognitive component.  Furthermore, the origins of the causal mechanism 
are important in a case formulation. In John’s case, information about the origins of the cognitive 
causal mechanism was obtained through a narrative of his early life experiences, including his 
family’s immigration, his mother’s failure to adapt to life in a foreign country, to learn English 
and to socialise, John’s subsequent isolation, and his father’s long absence and overly critical 
nature. These experiences were assumed to lead to the development of cognitive schemas, which 
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in turn caused negative automatic thoughts: Questions such as how? By what process? And what 
is the epistemic value of the links made between experiences, development of schema, and the 
pathological cognitive profile? are important to answer, in order to get an idea of the explanatory 
worth of these commonly used concepts in case formulation.  
Because of the limits of giving personal level explanations, it is proposed that the 
explanatory value of negative automatic thoughts is possibly less than avoidance behaviour due 
to the extent to which we know or understand mental events. This is not to say that mental events 
are of no explanatory value. Rather, like all causal explanations in case formulation, they have 
limitations. It is important that clinicians understand these limitations. The benefit of applying 
relative-magnitude-of-effect measures to causal mental events is an increased understanding of 
psychological constructs, and the improved hypothesising about, and, identification of, causal 
mechanisms. If case formulation skills are improved in this way then treatment is likely to be 
more successful because the most fruitful avenues of inquiry would be adopted first. However, 
for this to be done, a generic case formulation model, with no vested theoretical interest, should 
be employed. As stated previously, the worth of the case formulation depends on the validity of 
the concepts utilised within it, as well as the methods used within the case formulation process.  
Conclusion 
 Case formulation is of central importance to the practice of clinical psychology. It is the 
process whereby a clinician not only describes a client’s current difficulties, but also explains 
them through appeal to latent causal mechanisms. The processes of formulation and clinical 
reasoning are prone to bias, and therefore, attention needs to be paid to the way that information 
is collected and the way the formulation process is carried out, as well as the inferences that are 
made about underlying causal mechanisms. The focus of this thesis has been on the nature of 
mental events and personal level explanations that feature heavily in cognitive conceptualisations 
of psychopathology. Due to the importance of cognitive concepts in clinical psychology, 
cognitive causal mechanisms are often cited in case formulation and clinical reasoning. 
Therefore, the problems inherent in the use of mentalistic concepts in clinical psychology theory 
are considered to apply also to case formulation. It has been shown that although there is a place 
for personal explanation in terms of causally efficacious mental events, such explanations have 
differential worth, which should be taken into account when formulating cases. Employing a 
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relative-magnitude-of-effect strategy to causal mechanisms based on their epistemological value 
could help address this problem.  
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Conclusion 
 
The theory and practice of cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology relies on 
personal level explanation by appeal to the causal efficacy of mental events. This reliance is 
highlighted in the foundational claims of cognitive behavioural therapy: these include the claims 
that the way one interprets the world through subjective experience effects the way one feels and 
behaves; that these causal mental events, such as thoughts and beliefs can be objectively known 
and measured; and that they can be challenged and altered during the course of therapy, therefore 
improving mood and behaviour. The particular claims that CBT makes in relation to mental 
events are uncritically adhered to within clinical psychology, despite the existence of several 
convincing arguments that deny the causal efficacy of mental events. However, while mental 
events, as they feature in CBT, are not well understood, it is not suggested here that personal 
level explanation be eliminated from clinical psychology. On the contrary, this thesis has argued 
for their importance in the explanation of pathological behavioural and emotion states. Instead, it 
is contended that the foundational cognitive constructs which feature in cognitive behaviourally 
based clinical psychology need to be better understood. While there is extensive research on the 
effects of proposed cognitive latent causal mechanisms on cognitive processes like memory and 
attention, an ontological understanding of the nature of these mechanisms is almost nonexistent. 
Although the idea that thoughts and schemas exist is intuitively acceptable, this does not amount 
to acceptable scientific knowledge. When directly challenged, our understanding of mental 
events as found in cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology start to appear rather 
flimsy. Consider the following question: what is the nature of a thought? Where does it come 
from? How does it exist? And what are its relationship with other aspects of human functioning 
like emotion and behaviour? Furthermore; what is a schema? What is the nature of its 
physicality? And how does it cause intermediate and negative automatic thoughts?  While 
relatively few questions of this sort have been posed here, they are very difficult to answer based 
on the literature cited as ‘evidence’ for cognitive behavioural conceptualisations of 
psychopathology. This draws into question those foundation concepts found in CBT. However, 
while it is concluded that certain foundation constructs contained in cognitive behaviourally 
based clinical psychology are not well understood, this is not to suggest that they cannot be 
known in a more systematic and complete manner. Indeed, one only need look to philosophy of 
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mind to find rigorous debate that addresses the very questions that clinical psychology fails to 
ask, let alone attempts to answer. 
In order to attempt refining of concepts in cognitive behaviourally based clinical 
psychology using theories of mind found in the discipline of philosophy of mind, several issues 
needed to be address and clarifications made. Firstly, because cognitive behaviourally based 
clinical psychology invokes explanations at the personal level via appeal to causally efficacious 
mental events, while at the same time adhering to a scientific/naturalistic world view, the 
mind/brain problem is of direct relevance. The mind/brain problem is concerned with trying to 
link the mind to the brain. We all experience the world subjectively, but knowledge of the 
physical brain is objective. Given that all scientific explanations of natural phenomena must 
appeal to natural causes, what we know as the mind must come from the brain. Attempting to 
understand how they are linked is the referred to as the mind/brain problem. The mind/brain 
problem is of direct concern to cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology because CBT, 
in its causal models, appeals directly to subjectively experienced mental events. Therefore, 
cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology needs to be able to explain how these 
subjective experiences are liked to the processes and physicality of the brain. 
The tension between objectively and subjectively knowing the mind/brain is also found in 
scientific inquiry as a whole. There is a tension between empirical investigation, which attempts 
to gain knowledge by measurement and observation, and theoretical inquiry, which attempts to 
theorise about the phenomena that cannot be directly observed and measured. While empirical 
inquiry has been favoured in psychology, theoretical pursuits are arguably equally important. It 
is, in part, because of the lack of theoretical inquiry that the nature of mental events are not well 
understood in clinical psychology. Because the mind is not directly observable, theoretical, a 
priori, and philosophical inquiry can expand knowledge of the mind where empirical 
investigation cannot.  
Another issue which needed clarification before suggestions were made on how to apply 
philosophical theories of mind to cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology was how, in 
light of the development and history of CBT, mental events are conceptualised in clinical 
psychology. Cognitive behavioural therapy was developed in a clinical setting and was based on 
clinician intuition rather than on theory. This is one of the reasons why mentalistic concepts in 
CBT are not well understood, because it led to an emphasis being placed on treatment 
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effectiveness rather than the understanding of the nature of mental events. From an examination 
of CBT, it is established: that mental events are of central importance given the foundational 
claims of CBT listed at the beginning of this conclusion; that the way one interprets the world 
through subjective experience effects the way one feels and behaves; that these thoughts are 
measureable, and can be challenged; and that in doing so, mood and behaviour can be changed. 
In other words, subjectively experienced mental events can be causally efficacious.  
However, because the nature of mental events as espoused in cognitive behaviourally 
based clinical psychology are not well understood, it is not clear on what grounds they are 
causally efficacious. This is not to say that mental events cannot be causally efficacious. In order 
to establish the possibility of causally efficacious mental events, the main theories of mind were 
investigated to ascertain whether the conceptualisation of causal mental events in CBT can be 
defended metaphysically, given this cannot be done through empirical investigation. An 
investigation into the philosophy of mind established that it is possible to defend the causal 
nature of mental events. While Cartesian dualist, eliminativist, and radical behaviourist theories 
of mind deny the causal efficacy of mental events, autonomous mind theories of mind allow for 
the retention of personal level, meaningful, causal explanations. The representational theory of 
mind in particular, was found to be commensurable with the conceptualisation of mental events 
in CBT. They are commensurable because the representational theory of mind considers mental 
events to be causally efficacious due to the content of the mental event. Furthermore, the 
representational theory of mind gives an account of how causality is possible by appealing to the 
physicality and processes of the brain. It does so while retaining the importance of the qualia of 
mental events, which is consistent with the proposed evolution of the mind.  
In order to integrate the metaphysical concepts found in philosophy of mind with 
concepts found in the physical based discipline of clinical psychology, it was suggested that a 
levels-of-explanation framework be adopted in which the mind/brain is conceptualised as 
existing across levels from the micro physicality of the brain, up to personal level explanation, 
which includes higher cognitive phenomena such as thoughts and beliefs. In doing so it is 
possible both to explain how mental events can be causally related to both behaviour and 
emotion, and also to ground such explanation in the physicality of the brain.  The adoption of a 
levels-of-explanation approach also allows for the integration of the wide range of different types 
of information that is handled in clinical psychology.  
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It is a natural progression from establishing the need and the means for refining 
mentalistic concepts in cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology to suggest ways in 
which this refinement of theory can be applied to the practice clinical psychology. Firstly, the 
concept of evidence-based practice was considered.  Clinicians are ethically bound to ground 
their practice on the available research literature. Criticisms have been made of the way this 
ethical obligation is currently carried out. Principally, an overemphasis on ESTs has led to the 
primacy of proving treatments as effective and efficacious at the expense of developing 
foundational constructs. While it is worthwhile to establish the effectiveness and efficacy of 
therapeutic approaches, establishing the nature of the foundational concepts of those therapies, 
such as mental events, is of equal importance, but is not being achieved. Therefore, the 
improvement of foundational constructs in cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology can 
be regarded as an ethical obligation of clinical psychologists who strive to attain an evidence-
based practice.  
Lastly, psychological case formulation is the area of clinical psychology where theory 
and foundational constructs are applied directly to individual clients. Considering that case 
formulation is directly concerned with explaining pathological presentations through appeal to 
latent causal mechanisms, the weaknesses of foundational concepts used in case formulation 
have a direct implication for clinical practice, and therefore, for clients. If it is unclear what the 
nature of a mental event is, let alone how it is possible for a mental event to be causally 
efficacious, then how can clinicians claim in their formulations that certain mental events are 
causing certain pathological states?  However, while there are limits to personal level 
explanation via causally efficacious mental events, it has been shown that such explanations are 
justifiable. The caveat to their use, however, is that explanation at the personal level, through 
appeal to causal mental events, should include the consideration of the limits of undertaking such 
explanation. To this end, it is possible to apply a relative magnitude of effect judgement to 
proposed causal mechanisms that reflects the inherent epistemic worth of that construct. In this 
way, case formulation can be improved because causal mechanisms can be targeted based on the 
extent to which they are scientifically understood. 
At the beginning of this thesis the mind/body problem was posed. This problem was then 
demonstrated to be problematic for clinical psychology because of the way it conceptualises 
foundational constructs. The solution to this problem was considered to follow a logical 
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progression. Firstly, the foundational constructs of cognitive behaviourally based clinical 
psychology were explored. Then philosophical theories of mind that may help to refine and 
improve those foundational constructs were explored, and a way to apply them to theory in 
clinical psychology was suggested. Next, this application was modelled within the context of the 
importance of theory development in clinical psychology, and lastly, it was suggested how the 
refined theory could be utilised within the day-to-day practice of the clinical psychologist.  
The understanding of mind is a difficult task, but a task to which clinical psychology is 
committed. The importance of an individual’s subjective experience of the world cannot be 
ignored when attempting to explain psychopathological phenomena. However, clinical 
psychology also has a commitment to scientific inquiry when establishing knowledge claims. 
With regard to knowing the mind, these two commitments cause a number of specific and 
perplexing problems. Despite their difficulty, it is not impossible to gain a greater understanding 
of the foundational concepts on which cognitive behaviourally based clinical psychology rely. 
To achieve this, metaphysical theorising needs to be undertaken in order to improve important 
foundational constructs in clinical psychology, where empirical investigation cannot. In doing so, 
clinicians may find themselves better able to appreciate the ‘countryside’ of the mind rather than 
simply travelling with confidence along the known path of technique.   
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